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World Economic Situation and Prospects 2013 Global outlook
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Table I.1
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Figure I.1
Growth of world gross product, 2006-2014a
Source: UN/DESA.
a Growth rate for 2012 is partially estimated.
Estimates for 2013 and 2014 are forecasts.
See “Uncertainties and risks” section for a discussion of the downside scenario and box I.3 for a discussion of the policy scenario.
Figure I.2
Growth of GDP per capita by level of development, 2000-2014
Source: UN/DESA.
a Estimates.
b United Nations
forecasts
GDP is forecast to grow at 0.6 per cent in 2013 and 0.8 per cent in 2014, down from 1.5 per cent in 2012.
Figure I.3a
The vicious cycle of developed economies
Figure I.3b
Feeble policy efforts to break the vicious cycle
Source: UN/DESA
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Unemployment remains elevated in many developed economies, with the situation in Europe being the most challenging. A double-dip recession in several European economies has taken a heavy toll on labour markets. The unemployment rate continued to climb to a record high in the euro area during 2012, up by more than one percentage point from one year ago.
If economic growth stays as anaemic in developed countries as projected in the baseline forecast, employment rates will not return to pre-crisis levels until far beyond 2016 (figure I.4).
Figure I.4
Post-recession employment recovery in the United States, euro area and developed economies, 2007 (Q1)-2011 (Q2) and projections for 2012 (Q3)-2016 (Q4)
Source: UN/DESA, based on data from ILO and IMF.
Figure I.5
World merchandise exports volume, January 2006-August 2012
Source: CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, rebased by UN/DESA
[3]
3 See MDG Gap Task Force Report 2012: The Global Partnership for Development—Making Rhetoric a Reality (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.12.I.5).
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In the outlook, world oil demand is expected to remain subdued during 2013 and 2014. Supply is expected to further expand in several oil-producing areas, including North America, the Russian Federation and Brazil, partially off set by declines in the North Sea and Central Asia. Saudi Arabia is expected to lower production, thereby increasing spare capacity.
Figure I.6
Brent oil price, January 2000-October 2012
Source: UN/DESA.
Figure I.7
Daily grain prices, January 2007-October 2012
Source: International Grains Council
----------------------
[4] Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, “World cereal production in 2012 down 2.7 percent from the 2011 record”, FAO Cereal Supply and Demand Brief, 8 November 2012, available from http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/wfs-home/csdb/en/.
----------------------
Figure I.8
Non-oil commodity prices, 2000-2014
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5 Institute of International Finance, “Capital fl ows to emerging market economies”, IIF Research Note, 13 October 2012. Data referring to private capital fl ows in this section cover about 30 emerging market economies and discuss net capital infl ows separate from net outfl ows. In this sense the data diff er from those presented in chapter III, which cover all developing and transition economies and apply the “net net fl ow” concept, that is net infl ows less net outfl ows.
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Figure I.9
Net capital flows to emerging markets
Billions of dollars
Greek crisis
Irish crisis
First ECB
LRTO
Source: IMF, WEO database, October 2012.
The costs of external borrowing fi nancing increased for developing countries and economies in transition when the crisis in the euro area escalated in mid-2012, but have since decreased and remain low in general (figure I.10).
Figure I.10
Daily yield spreads on emerging market bonds, January 2007-October 2012
percentage points
Africa
Asia
Latin America
Europe
Source: JPMorgan Chase
[6] See, for example, the discussion in World Economic and Social Survey 2010: Retooling Global Development (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.10.II.C.1), chap V.
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[7] MDG Gap Task Force Report 2012, op. cit.
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Figure I.11
Exchange rates of major currencies vis-à-vis the United States dollar, January 2002-October 2012
Inde:x 2, January 2002 =100
Euro
Japanese yen
Swiss franc
Source: UN/DESA, based on data from JPMorgan Chase
Figure I.12
Exchange rates of selected developing country currencies vis-à-vis the United States dollar, January 2002-October 2012
Brazilian real
Korean won
South African rand
Source: UN/DESA, based on data from JPMorgan Chase.
Figure I.13
Global imbalances, 1997-2014
Curreent, account balances as a percentage of world gross product
World Economic Situation and Prospects 2013
[8]8 See Ernst & Young, “The future of Russian oil exploration: Beyond 2025”, available from http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Perspectives-of-Oil-and-Gas-explorations-2011-EN/$FILE/Perspectives-of-Oil-and-Gas-explorations-2011-EN.pdf.
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Figure I.14
Net international investment position in the United States
Billions of dollars
Source: UN/DESA, based on United States Bureau of Economic Analysis data.
Note: Data for 2009 and 2010 has been revised; data for 2011 is preliminary.
World Economic Situation and Prospects 2013
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The baseline outlook presented above is subject to major uncertainties and risks, mostly on the downside. The economic crisis in the euro area could continue to worsen and become more disruptive. The United States could fail to avert a fiscal cliff. The slowdown in a number of large developing countries, including China, could well deteriorate further, potentially ending in a “hard landing”. Geopolitical tensions in West Asia and elsewhere in the world might spiral out of control. Given dangerously low stock-use ratios of basic grains, world food prices may easily spike with any significant weather shock and take a toll on the more vulnerable and poorest countries in the world. The discussion in this section focuses on the likelihood of the occurrence of the first three of these risks and what impact there would be on the global economy should they materialize.
The crisis in the euro area continues to loom as the largest threat to global growth. The economies in the euro area have been suffering from entanglement in a number of vicious circles. The dangerous dynamics between sovereign debt distress and banking sector fragility are deteriorating the balance sheets of both Governments and commercial banks. The fiscal austerity responses are exacerbating the economic downturn, inspiring self-defeating efforts at fiscal consolidation and pushing up debt ratios, thereby triggering further budget cuts.
As a result, the region has already fallen into another recession three years after the global Great Recession of 2009, with unemployment rates rising to record highs since the debut of the euro. The situation in Greece remains particularly dire, despite the fact that fears of an imminent exit from the monetary union have eased and Greek government bond yields have subsequently retreated from their peaks following the debt restructuring in early 2012. GDP continues to plunge, however, even after having already fallen by nearly 20 percent since 2007. Unless the troika of the EU, the ECB and the IMF relax the terms of conditionality on the target and the time span of Greek fiscal adjustment, and also provide more support, the economy will be unable to extricate itself from the present crisis any time soon.
The focus of attention shifted towards Spain in mid-2012. Spain is the fourth largest economy of the euro area, with a GDP twice the size of Greece, Ireland and Portugal combined. The country’s borrowing costs surged when the Government asked for international financing to recapitalize the banks in early June 2012. Yields on 10-year sovereign bonds peaked at 7.6 percent in late July, surpassing the level Greece, Ireland and Portugal faced when they were forced to ask for international assistance to address debt distress. Financial market contagion spread to Italy, which also has seen significant increases in sovereign borrowing costs.
After the announcement, sovereign yields of Spain and a few other countries retreated substantially (figure I.15). In late September, Spanish authorities presented a budget that aims to cut the projected 2013 deficit by €40 billion ($51.4 billion). Government spending is to be cut by 8.9 percent, while public infrastructure spending is to drop from 1.3 percent to 0.89 percent of GDP, among other austerity measures. A recent bank stress test showed a capital shortfall of €59.3 billion for Spanish banks. It will be feasible to repair this with the €100 billion in European aid the Spanish Government has already requested for recapitalization of its banks.
Figure I.15
Yields on two-year government bonds of selected euro area countries, January 2010-October 2012
Percentage points
Germany
Greece (right-hand scale)
Ireland
Portugal
Spain
Source: JPMorgan Chase.
World Economic Situation and Prospects 2013
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In contrast with Greece, some analysts argue that Spain’s woes started in the private sector as the housing bubble burst, drastically reducing government tax revenue and prompting a rescue of banks. Before that, the Government had relatively low debt levels and a modest deficit. From this perspective, fiscal austerity would not address the root cause of the problem in Spain, but only exacerbate the economic downturn and cause more unemployment.
Given all the uncertainties and risks, a number of researchers have already studied the scenarios and economic ramifications of the possible exit of some euro area members.[10] The pessimistic scenario, discussed further below, does not assume any break-up of the euro area or the exit of any of its members, however. The real implications of such an event are extremely difficult to gauge because of the large amount of financial market uncertainty that would arise and the complex, but as yet unknown, set of institutional rearrangements that would result.
[10] Global Insight estimates that an exit of Greece would come with substantial international spillover effects. It estimates that the simulated output loss for the United States could be as much as 2.5 percent, pushing the economy into recession in 2013. (See IHS Global Insight, “US Executive Summary”, November 2012). Oxford Economics (“Central banks take out additional insurance”, Global Scenario Service, September 2012) estimates that an exit of Greece in the third quarter of 2013 would lower euro area GDP by 3.5 percent and WGP would drop 1.3 percent below the baseline for 2014.
in China, from 10.4 percent to 7.7 percent; and in India, from 8.9 percent to 5.5 percent.
The slowdown in investment growth in China has been driven primarily by two factors. First, the Government has adopted policies to control the risk of asset price bubbles in the housing sector, including requirements for larger down payments and limits on the number of housing units people can buy. Real estate investment, which accounts for about 25 percent of total fixed investment, increased by 15 percent in the first half of 2012, but the pace of growth was down from 33 percent recorded a year ago. Acquisition of land for home construction has been declining at an annualized pace of about 20 percent since the beginning of 2012. Because this is a key source of revenue for local governments in China, their fiscal space has been heavily reduced. Slower real estate investment growth also has considerable damaging effects on supplying industries.
Most of the 2009-2010 large-scale fiscal stimulus package, costing about 4 trillion yuan, was used for infrastructure investment and formed an important driver of economic growth in those years. However, after it was phased out in 2011, increasing concerns have been expressed in China over unintended side effects created by the stimulus and vast excess production capacity emerging in some industrial sectors. The Government seems set to put more effort into restructuring the economy, rather than trying to create more aggregate demand stimulus. This is based on the assumption that a rebalancing of the economy through an increase in the share of household consumption in GDP could compensate for a decline in the investment rate and a slowdown in exports. It assumes that with such rebalancing the economy could still grow at a robust pace of 7.5 percent (which is the official growth target for 2012). However, thus far it has proven difficult to boost consumption in the short run and, moreover, industrial restructuring and future GDP growth would require making substantial new investments today.
Furthermore, local governments have been facing financing constraints in the implementation of new projects. Fixed investment projects managed by local governments account for more than 90 percent of total fixed investment in value terms. The financing constraints have emerged because of less revenue from land sales and lack of bank lending as the banks await positive signals from the central Government.
Because of these factors, there are substantial risks for much lower GDP growth in China. The downside scenario presented below assumes a slowdown in growth to about 5 percent per year, particularly if fixed investment growth decelerates further, subtracting another 5-10 percentage points per year in 2013-2014. Other assumptions for this alternative scenario for the Chinese economy include the central Government maintaining the tightening measures in the housing sector and no fiscal stimulus.
Table I.2 summarizes the global economic consequences of the three scenarios discussed above, based on simulations using the United Nations World Economic Forecasting Model.
The euro crisis scenario focuses on the relatively high risk of deeper fiscal cuts in the debt-distressed countries. For reasons mentioned above, the much worse case, but, for now, less likely scenario of a break-up of the monetary union is not considered here.
More specifically, in this first scenario, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain are expected to take further austerity measures in 2013, with deeper cuts than assumed in the baseline. As a result, the estimated output losses in these economies would be between 1 and 2 percentage points in 2013. The deeper recession is assumed to spread to other economies through trade channels and, more importantly, through greater financial uncertainty as confidence in the euro and prospects for recovery erodes further. As a result, the economy of the euro area would shrink by 0.9 percent compared with the baseline forecast for 2013, thus further deepening the euro area recession that set in throughout 2012. During 2013-2015, the cumulative output loss for the euro area as a whole would amount to 3.3 percent. The further weakening in the euro area would spill over to the rest of the world and the cumulative loss of global output would amount to 1.1 percentage points. The other developed economies, such as the United States and Japan, would all suffer notable losses. The deepening of the euro crisis would cost developing countries about 0.5 percent of GDP on average.
In the fiscal cliff scenario, world economic growth would slow to 1.2 percent in 2013, compared to 2.4 percent in the baseline. The cumulative output loss between 2013 and 2015 would be 2.5 percentage points. The United States economy would enter into recession and Japan and the EU would also be severely affected, with output losses of about 2 percentage points during 2013-2015. Mexico and Central America would be hardest hit among developing countries, losing about 3.0 percentage points owing to close economic ties with the United States. East Asian economies would see cumulative output losses of about 1.6 percentage points.
A hard landing of the Chinese economy, with GDP growth slowing to 5 percent in 2013, would also have a visible impact on the world economy. China accounts for about 8 percent of WGP and 10 percent of world trade. Compared with the baseline forecast, a 3 percentage point deceleration in the pace of growth of the Chinese economy would cause a cumulative global output loss of 1.5 percentage points during 2013-2015.
Given its close economic ties with China, Japan would be most affected, suffering a GDP loss of 1.6 percentage points. GDP of the United States and the EU would drop by 0.7 and 0.6 percentage points, respectively, over 2013-2015 compared with the baseline.
Much of their output losses would be caused by lower exports of capital goods to China.
Table I.2
Developing Asia would also feel the consequences through trade channels, especially as it experiences decreased demand for intermediate products in the context of global value chains (see chapter II for further discussion). Economies in Latin America, Africa and Western Asia would be most impacted by lower demand for primary commodities, losing about 1 percent of their aggregate income.
It is difficult to ascertain the probability of these three risks materializing simultaneously.
However, considering the magnitude of the global consequences of each of these events separately, if these events were to occur at the same time, thereby reinforcing each other, the global economy would fall into another Great Recession.
[15] International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Monitor: Taking stock—A progress report on fiscal adjustment (Washington, D.C., October 2012).
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Fourth, sufficient resources must be available to developing countries, especially and those possessing limited fiscal spacefacing large development needs. These resources will be needed to accelerate progress towards the achievement of the MDGs and for investments in sustainable and resilient growth, especially for the LDCs. has Fiscal austerity among donor countriesalso affected aid budgets, as seen in the decline of ODA in real terms in 2011. Further declines may be expected in the outlook. Apart from delivering on existing aid commitments, donor countries should consider mechanisms to delink aid flows from their business cycles so as to prevent delivery shortfalls in times of crisis when the need for development aid is most urgent. In this regard, internationally agreed taxes (such as airline levies, currency transaction taxes or carbon taxes), along with the possibility of leveraging idle special drawing rights (SDRs) for development finance could be considered, as suggested in a recent United Nations report.[16]
[16] World Economic and Social Survey 2012: In Search of New Development Finance (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.12.II.C.1).
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A jobs creation and green growth-oriented agenda as outlined above is compatible with medium-term reduction of public debt ratios and benign global rebalancing, as shown in a scenario of internationally concerted policies simulated using the United Nations Global Policy Model (GPM).[17] With continued existing policies, but assuming no major deepening of the euro crisis, growth of WGP would average, at best, about 3 percent per year on average, far from sufficient to deal with the jobs crisis or bring down public debt ratios. The alternative scenario, based on the agenda outlined above, includes a shift in fiscal policies away from austerity and towards more job creation through, inter alia, more spending on infrastructure; energy efficiency, social programmes and tax and subsidy measures to stimulate private investment projects in these areas; continued expansionary monetary policies aligned with stronger capital account regulation to stem capital flow volatility; and enhanced development assistance to the poorest nations. The GPM simulations show that under such a policy scenario, WGP would grow at an average rate of 4.5 percent between 2013 and 2017, public debt-to-GDP ratios would stabilize and start falling from 2016 or earlier. Employment levels in major developed countries would gradually increase and return to pre-crises levels in absolute terms by 2014 and by 2017 after accounting for labour force growth. The employment recovery thus would come much sooner than in the baseline, although remaining protracted even with the suggested internationally concerted strategy for growth and jobs. An additional 33 million jobs per year on average would be created in developing and transition economies between 2013 and 2017 (see box I.3).
[17] The scenario is an update of the ones presented in World Economic Situation and Prospects 2012, op. cit., pp. 33-36; and United Nations Economic and Social Council, “World economic situation and prospects as of mid-2012 (E/2012/72).
Under these assumptions, growth of world gross product would accelerate to about 4.5 percent per year, with both developed and developing economies accelerating output growth by between 1 and 2 percentage points compared with the baseline (see figures A and B). Shortly after the new policies are in place, the jobs defi cit caused by the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 would start to close, especially in the developed countries. Employment levels in major developed countries would gradually increase and return to pre-crisis levels in absolute terms by 2014, and by 2017 after accounting for labour force growth. The employment recovery would thus come much sooner than in the baseline, although it would remain protracted, even with the suggested internationally concerted strategy for growth and jobs. An additional 33 million jobs per year on average would be created in developing and transition economies between 2013 and 2017.
The simulation also shows that more rapid recovery of growth and employment helps to stabilize public debts. After an initial increase, government defi cits would quickly decrease, stabilizing public debt ratios in the medium term and reducing them thereafter (see Appendix table). As countries with an external surplus apply more fiscal stimulus, private investment and consumption would increase, leading to higher imports and a reduction of global current account imbalances.
With investments targeting higher energy efficiency and production of renewable energy, world energy prices would stabilize on lower levels over the medium run. Meanwhile, investment in sustainable agricultural production would allow meeting a growing demand for food and stabilize world food prices.
Source: UN/DESA Global Policy Model ( http://www.un.org/esa/policy/publications/ungpm.html).
Figure A: Employment levels of selected countries or country groups
Index: 2008=100
(a) Europe, Japan and other developed economies
(b) United States
(c) Transition and developing economies
China and India
CIS, and other developing
Baseline
Coordinated strategy for jobs and growth
Global economic outlook
Figure B: GDP growth rates of selected countries or country groups
Percentage
(a) Europe, Japan and other developed economies
(b) United States
(c) Transition and developing economies
Baseline
Coordinated strategy for jobs and growth
Global economic outlook
Appendix
An internationally coordinated strategy for jobs and growth, 2012-2017
Source: UN/DESA Global Policy Model, available from http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/publications/un_gpm.shtml.
World Economic Situation and Prospects 2013
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2013Chap1_embargo.pdf
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Extra Report:
Definition of 'Bush Tax Cuts'
A series of temporary income tax relief measures enacted by President George W. Bush in 2001 and 2003. The tax cuts lowered federal income tax rates for everyone, decreased the marriage penalty, lowered capital gains taxes, lowered the tax rate on dividend income, increased the child tax credit from $500 to $1,000 per child, eliminated the phaseout on personal exemptions for higher-income taxpayers and eliminated the phaseout on itemized deductions and eliminated the estate tax.
Investopedia explanation for 'Bush Tax Cuts'
Because the tax cuts were in place for so many years, they began to feel permanent rather than temporary, and taxpayers and politicians raised a major outcry as their expiration date approached. Those who wanted to let the tax cuts expire as scheduled argued that the government needed the extra tax revenue in the face of massive its budget deficits. Those who wanted to extend the tax cuts or make them permanent argued that because taxes reduce economic growth and stifle entrepreneurship and incentives to work, effectively increasing taxes during a recession was a bad idea
Real world price of food & primary
commodities (index)X 1.2X 1.2X1.3 X1.3X 1.4 X1.4
Real world price of manufactures (index) X1.0 X1.0X 1.0X 1.0 X1.0X 1.0
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World Economic Situation and Prospects 2013 Global outlook
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2013Chap1_embargo
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Chapter 1
Global economic outlook
Prospects for the world economy in 2013-2014
Risk of a synchronized global downturn
The world economy continues to struggle with post-crisis adjustments
Four years after the eruption of the
global financial crisis, the world
economy is still struggling to recover. During 2012, global economic
growth has weakened further. A growing number of
developed economies
have fallen into a double-dip recession. Those in severe
sovereign debt
distress moved even deeper into recession, caught in the downward
spiralling dynamics from high unemployment,
weak aggregate
demand
compounded by fiscal austerity, high public debt
burdens, and financial
sector fragility. Growth in the
major developing countries and
economies in transition has also decelerated
notably, reflecting both
external
vulnerabilities and domestic
challenges. Most low-income
countries have held up relatively well so far, but now face intensified
adverse spillover effects from the slowdown in both developed and major
middle-income countries. The prospects
for the next two years continue
to be challenging,
fraught with major uncertainties and risksslanted
towards the downside.
The global slowdown will put additional strains on developing countries
Conditioned on
a set of assumptions in the United Nations
baseline
forecast (box I.1), growth of world
gross product (WGP) is expected to
reach 2.2 percent in 2012 and is forecast to remain well below
potential at 2.4 percent in 2013 and 3.2 percent in 2014 (table
I.1 and
figure I.1). At this moderate pace, many
economies will continue to
operate below potential and will not recover the
jobs lost during the
Great Recession.
The slowdown is synchronized across countries of different levels of development (figure I.2). For many developing countries, the global slowdown will imply a much slower pace of poverty reduction and narrowing of fiscal space for investments in education, health, basic sanitation and other critical areas needed for accelerating the progress to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This holds true in particular for the least developed countries (LDCs); they remain highly vulnerable to commodity price shocks and are receiving less external financing as official development assistance (ODA) declines in the face of greater fiscal austerity in donor countries (see below).
Conditions vary greatly across LDCs, however. At one end of the spectrum, countries that went through political turmoil and transition, like Sudan and Yemen, experienced major economic adversity during 2010 and 2011, while strong growth performances continued in Bangladesh and a fair number of African LDCs (box I.2).
The slowdown is synchronized across countries of different levels of development (figure I.2). For many developing countries, the global slowdown will imply a much slower pace of poverty reduction and narrowing of fiscal space for investments in education, health, basic sanitation and other critical areas needed for accelerating the progress to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This holds true in particular for the least developed countries (LDCs); they remain highly vulnerable to commodity price shocks and are receiving less external financing as official development assistance (ODA) declines in the face of greater fiscal austerity in donor countries (see below).
Conditions vary greatly across LDCs, however. At one end of the spectrum, countries that went through political turmoil and transition, like Sudan and Yemen, experienced major economic adversity during 2010 and 2011, while strong growth performances continued in Bangladesh and a fair number of African LDCs (box I.2).
Weakness in developed economies underpins the global slowdown
Weaknesses in
the major developed economies are at the root
of
continued global economic woes. Most of them, but particularly
those in
Europe, are dragged
into a downward spiral as high unemployment,
continued
deleveraging by firms and households, continued
banking
fragility, heightened
sovereign risks, fiscal
tightening, and slower
growth viciously feed into one another
(figure I.3a).
Several European economies are already in recession. In Germany, output has also slowed significantly, while France’s economy is stagnating. A number of new policy initiatives were taken by the euro area authorities in 2012, including the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme and steps towards greater fiscal integration and coordinated financial supervision and regulation.
Thesee measures address some of the deficiencies in the original design of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
Significant as they may be, however, these measures are still being counteracted by other policy stances, fiscal austerity in particular, and are not sufficient to break economies out of the vicious circle and restore output and employment growth in the short run (figure I.3b). In the baseline outlook for the euro area, GDP is expected to grow by only 0.3 percent in 2013 and 1.4 percent in 2014, a feeble recovery from a decline of 0.5 percent in 2012. Because of the dynamics of the vicious circle, the risk for a much worse scenario remains high. Economic growth in the new European Union (EU) members also decelerated during 2012, with some, including the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia, falling back into recession.
Worsening external conditions are compounded by fiscal austerity measures, aggravating short-term growth prospects. In the outlook, GDP growth in these economies is expected to remain subdued at 2.0 percent in 2013 and 2.9 percent in 2014, but risks are high for a much worse performance if the situation in the euro area deteriorates further.
Several European economies are already in recession. In Germany, output has also slowed significantly, while France’s economy is stagnating. A number of new policy initiatives were taken by the euro area authorities in 2012, including the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme and steps towards greater fiscal integration and coordinated financial supervision and regulation.
Thesee measures address some of the deficiencies in the original design of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
Significant as they may be, however, these measures are still being counteracted by other policy stances, fiscal austerity in particular, and are not sufficient to break economies out of the vicious circle and restore output and employment growth in the short run (figure I.3b). In the baseline outlook for the euro area, GDP is expected to grow by only 0.3 percent in 2013 and 1.4 percent in 2014, a feeble recovery from a decline of 0.5 percent in 2012. Because of the dynamics of the vicious circle, the risk for a much worse scenario remains high. Economic growth in the new European Union (EU) members also decelerated during 2012, with some, including the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia, falling back into recession.
Worsening external conditions are compounded by fiscal austerity measures, aggravating short-term growth prospects. In the outlook, GDP growth in these economies is expected to remain subdued at 2.0 percent in 2013 and 2.9 percent in 2014, but risks are high for a much worse performance if the situation in the euro area deteriorates further.
Table I.1
Growth of world output, 2006-2014
Annual percentage change
Table I.1 | Annual percentage change | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Growth of world output, 2006-2014 | Change from June 2012 forecastd | |||||||
2006-2009a | 2010 | 2011b | 2012c | 2013c | 2014c | 2012 | 2013 | |
World | 1.1 | 4.0 | 2.7 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 3.2 | -0.3 | -0.7 |
Developed economies | -0.4 | 2.6 | 1.4 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 2.0 | -0.1 | -0.7 |
United States of America | -0.5 | 2.4 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 2.7 | 0.0 | -0.6 |
Japan | -1.5 | 4.5 | -0.7 | 1.5 | 0.6 | 0.8 | -0.2 | -1.5 |
European Union | -0.3 | 2.1 | 1.5 | -0.3 | 0.6 | 1.7 | -0.3 | -0.6 |
EU-15 | -0.5 | 2.1 | 1.4 | -0.4 | 0.5 | 1.6 | -0.3 | -0.6 |
New EU members | 2.1 | 2.3 | 3.1 | 1.2 | 2.0 | 2.9 | -0.5 | -0.8 |
Euro area | -0.4 | 2.1 | 1.5 | -0.5 | 0.3 | 1.4 | -0.2 | -0.6 |
Other European countries | 0.9 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 1.9 | 0.6 | 0.2 |
Other developed countries | 1.2 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 0.0 | -0.6 |
Economies in transition | 2.2 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 4.2 | -0.5 | -0.6 |
South-Eastern Europe | 1.6 | 0.4 | 1.1 | -0.6 | 1.2 | 2.6 | -1.2 | -0.6 |
Commonwealth of Independent States and Georgia | 2.2 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 4.4 | -0.5 | -0.6 |
Russian Federation | 1.7 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 4.2 | -0.7 | -0.8 |
Developing economies | 5.2 | 7.7 | 5.7 | 4.7 | 5.1 | 5.6 | -0.6 | -0.7 |
Africa | 4.7 | 4.7 | 1.1 | 5.0 | 4.8 | 5.1 | 0.8 | 0.0 |
North Africa | 4.2 | 4.1 | -6.0 | 7.5 | 4.4 | 4.9 | 3.1 | 0.0 |
Sub-Saharan Africa | 5.0 | 5.0 | 4.5 | 3.9 | 5.0 | 5.2 | -0.2 | 0.0 |
Nigeria | 6.6 | 7.8 | 7.4 | 6.4 | 6.8 | 7.2 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
South Africa | 2.5 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 2.5 | 3.1 | 3.8 | -0.3 | -0.4 |
Others | 6.3 | 5.5 | 4.4 | 3.9 | 5.5 | 5.3 | -0.3 | 0.1 |
East and South Asia | 7.1 | 9.0 | 6.8 | 5.5 | 6.0 | 6.3 | -0.8 | -0.8 |
East Asia | 7.2 | 9.2 | 7.1 | 5.8 | 6.2 | 6.5 | -0.7 | -0.7 |
China | 11.0 | 10.3 | 9.2 | 7.7 | 7.9 | 8.0 | -0.6 | -0.6 |
South Asia | 6.4 | 8.3 | 5.8 | 4.4 | 5.0 | 5.7 | -1.2 | -1.1 |
India | 7.3 | 9.6 | 6.9 | 5.5 | 6.1 | 6.5 | -1.2 | -1.1 |
Western Asia | 2.3 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 4.1 | -0.7 | -1.1 |
Latin America and the Caribbean | 2.5 | 6.0 | 4.3 | 3.1 | 3.9 | 4.4 | -0.5 | -0.3 |
South America | 3.9 | 6.5 | 4.5 | 2.7 | 4.0 | 4.4 | -0.9 | -0.4 |
Brazil | 3.6 | 7.5 | 2.7 | 1.3 | 4.0 | 4.4 | -2.0 | -0.5 |
Mexico and Central America | -0.1 | 5.4 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 3.9 | 4.6 | 0.6 | 0.0 |
Mexico | -0.6 | 5.5 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.8 | 4.6 | 0.5 | -0.1 |
Caribbean | 3.6 | 3.5 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 3.7 | 3.8 | -0.4 | -0.3 |
By level of development | ||||||||
High-income countries | -0.2 | 2.9 | 1.6 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 2.2 | ||
Upper middle income countries | 5.3 | 7.4 | 5.8 | 5.1 | 5.4 | 5.8 | ||
Lower middle income countries | 5.8 | 7.4 | 5.6 | 4.4 | 5.5 | 6.0 | ||
Low-income countries | 5.9 | 6.6 | 6.0 | 5.7 | 5.9 | 5.9 | ||
Least developed countries | 7.2 | 5.8 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 5.7 | 5.5 | -0.4 | 0.0 |
Memorandum items | ||||||||
World tradee | -0.3 | 13.3 | 7.0 | 3.3 | 4.3 | 4.9 | -0.8 | -1.2 |
World output growth with PPP-based weights | 2.3 | 5.0 | 3.7 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 4.0 | -0.4 | -0.7 |
2006-2009a | 2010 | 2011b | 2012c | 2013c | 2014c | 2012 | 2013 | |
Growth of world output, 2006-2014 | Change from June 2012 forecastd | |||||||
a | Average percentage change. | |||||||
b | Actual or most recent estimates. | |||||||
c | Forecast, based in part on Project LINK and baseline projections of the UN/DESA World Economic Forecasting Model. | |||||||
d | See United Nations, World Economic Situation and Prospects as of mid-2012 (E/2012/72). | |||||||
e | Includes goods and services. | |||||||
Source: | UN/DESA |
----
Figure I.1
Growth of world gross product, 2006-2014a
Source: UN/DESA.
a Growth rate for 2012 is partially estimated.
Estimates for 2013 and 2014 are forecasts.
See “Uncertainties and risks” section for a discussion of the downside scenario and box I.3 for a discussion of the policy scenario.
Figure I.2
Growth of GDP per capita by level of development, 2000-2014
Source: UN/DESA.
a Estimates.
b United Nations
forecasts
Box I.1 |
Major assumptions for the baseline forecast |
---|---|
The forecast presented in the
text is based on estimates calculated
using the United Nations World Economic Forecasting Model (WEFM) and is
informed by country-specific economic outlooks provided by
participants in Project LINK, a network of institutions and researchers
supported by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the
United Nations. The provisional individual country forecasts submitted
by country experts are adjusted based on harmonized global assumptions
and the imposition of global consistency rules (especially for trade
flows, measured in both volume and value) set by the WEFM. The main
global assumptions are discussed below and form the core of the
baseline forecast—the scenario that is assigned the highest
probability of occurrence. Alternative scenarios are presented in the
sections on “Uncertainties and risks” and “Policy
challenges”. Those scenarios are normally assigned lower
probability than the baseline forecast.
Monetary policyThe Federal
Reserve of the United States (Fed) is
assumed to keep the
federal funds interest rate at the current low level of between 0.00
and 0.25 percent until mid-2015. It is assumed that the Fed will
purchase agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per
month until the end of 2014, and will also continue its programme to
extend the average maturity of its securities holdings through the end
of 2012, as well as reinvest principal payments from its holdings of
agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities. The European
Central
Bank (ECB) is
assumed to cut the minimum bid and marginal lending
facility rates by another 25 basis points, leaving the deposit rate at
0 percent. It is also assumed that the ECB will start
to implement the
announced new policy initiative, Outright Monetary Transactions
(OMT),
to purchase the government bonds of Spain and a few selected members of
the euro area. The Bank of Japan (BoJ) will keep the policy interest
rate at the current level (0.0-0.1 percent) and implement the Asset
Purchase Program, with a ceiling of ¥91 trillion, as
announced.
With regard to major emerging economies, the People’s
Bank of
China (PBC) is
expected to reduce reserve requirement rates twice in
2013 and reduce interest rates one more time in the same period.
Fiscal policyIn the United
States, it is assumed that the 2 percent payroll tax cut
and emergency unemployment insurance benefits are extended for 2013,
to be phased out gradually over several years. It is also assumed that
the automatic spending cuts now scheduled to begin in January 2013 will
be delayed, giving more time for the new Congress and president to
produce a package of spending cuts and tax increases effective in
2014. The Bush tax cuts are assumed to be extended for 2013-2014. As a
result, real federal government spending on goods and services will
fall about 3.0 percent in 2013 and 2014, after a fall of about 2.5
percent in the previous two years.
In the euro area, fiscal policy is assumed to be focused on reducing fiscal imbalances. The majority of countries remain subject to the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) under which they must submit plans to bring their fiscal deficits close to balance within a specified time frame. Typically, a minimum correction of 0.5 percent per annum is expected, and the time frames range from 2012 to 2014. The time periods for achieving these targets will be extended in the most difficult cases. It is also assumed that in the event that tensions increase in sovereign debt markets, affected euro area countries will seek assistance from the rescue fund, thus activating the new OMT programme of the ECB. It is assumed that this will allow increases in bond yields to be contained and that the policy conditionality attached to the use of OMT finance will not entail additional fiscal austerity; rather, Governments requesting funds will be pressed to fully implement already announced fiscal consolidation measures. In Japan, the newly ratifi ed bill to increase the consumption tax rate from its current level of 5 percent to 8 percent by April 2014 and to 10 percent by October 2015 will be implemented. Real government expenditure, including investment, is assumed to decline by a small proportion in 2013-2014, mainly owing to phasing out of reconstruction spending. In China, the Government is assumed to maintain a proactive fiscal policy stance, with an increase in public investment spending on infrastructure in 2013. Exchange rates among major currenciesIt is assumed that during the forecasting period of 2013-2014, the euro will fl uctuate about $1.28 per euro. The Japanese yen is assumed to average about ¥80 per United States dollar, and the renminbi will average CNY6.23 per United States dollar.Oil pricesOil prices (Brent) are assumed to average about $105 per barrel (pb) in 2013-2014, compared to $110 pb in 2012. |
|
Sorce: | World Economic Situation and Prospects 2013 Global outlook |
Growth in the United States will slow, with significant downside risks
The United
States economy weakened
notably during 2012, and growth
prospects for 2013 and 2014 remain sluggish. On the up side, the
beleaguered housing sector is showing some nascent signs of recovery.
Further support is expected from the new round of quantitative easing
(QE)
recently launched by the United States Federal Reserve (Fed)
whereby monetary authorities will continue to purchase mortgage-backed
securities until the employment situation improves substantially. On
the down side, the lingering uncertainties about the fiscal stance
continue to restrain growth of business investment. External demand
is
also expected to remain weak. In the baseline
outlook, gross domestic
product (GDP) growth
in the United States is forecast to decelerate to
1.7 percent in 2013 from an already anaemic pace of 2.1 percent
in
2012. Risks
remain high for a much bleaker scenario, emanating from the
“fiscal
cliff ” which would entail a drop in aggregate
demand of as much as 4 percent of GDP during 2013 and 2014 (see
“Uncertainties
and risks” section).
Adding to the already sombre scenario are anticipated spillover effects from possible intensification of the euro area crisis, a “hard landing” of the Chinese economy and greater weakening of other major developing economies.
Adding to the already sombre scenario are anticipated spillover effects from possible intensification of the euro area crisis, a “hard landing” of the Chinese economy and greater weakening of other major developing economies.
The need for fiscal consolidation will reduce growth in Japan
Economic growth in Japan in 2012 was
up from a year ago, mainly driven
by reconstruction works and recovery from the earthquake-related
disasters of 2011. The Government also took measures to stimulate
private consumption. Exports faced strong headwinds from the slowdown
in global demand and appreciation of the yen. In the outlook, Japan’s
economy is
expected to slow given the phasing out of
private consumption incentives combined
with a new measure increasing taxes on
consumption, anticipated
reductions in pension benefits, and government spending
cuts. These measures responded to concerns about the extremely
high level of public indebtedness.
The impact of the greater fiscal austerity will be mitigated by
reconstruction investments, which will continue but at a slower pace.
Box I.2 |
Prospects for the least developed countries |
---|---|
The economies of the least
developed countries (LDCs) are expected to rebound in 2013. GDP growth
is projected to average 5.7 percent in 2013, up from 3.7 percent in
2012. However, most of the rebound is expected to come from
improvements in economic conditions in Yemen and Sudan, following
notable contractions of both economies in the face of political
instability during 2010 and 2011.
In per capita terms, GDP growth
for LDCs is expected to accelerate from 1.3 percent in 2012 to 3.3
percent in 2013. While an improvement, at this rate welfare progress
will remain well below the pace of 5.0 percent per annum experienced
during much of the 2000s, prior to the world economic and financial
crisis.
Economic
performance varies greatly among LDCs, however. Numerous oil
exporters such as Angola and Guinea will benefit from continued solid
oil prices, propelling GDP growth to more than 7 percent and 4 percent,
respectively, in 2013. LDCs with a
predominant agricultural sector have seen volatile economic
conditions. In Gambia,
for example, where agriculture provides about one third of total
output, poor
crop conditions caused GDP to contract by 1.0 percent in 2012.
Much better harvests are expected to propel GDP growth to 6.2 percent. Such sharp swings in the overall economic performance create multiple problems for policymakers. The inherent uncertainty not only complicates the planning and design of economic policies, especially those of a longer-term nature, but it also threatens the implementation of existing policy plans owing to sudden dramatic changes in economic parameters. In addition, unforeseen crises create needs—in the form of shortterm assistance to farmers, for example—which divert scarce financial and institutional resources away from more structurally oriented policy areas. On the other hand, Ethiopia’s robust growth of the past few years is expected to come down slightly but remain strong, partly owing to its programme of developing the agricultural sector. A number of LDCs have also seen
solid investment and consumption, supported by sustained inflows of
worker remittances. This applies, for example, to Bangladesh, whose
growth rate will continue to exceed 6.0 percent in 2013 and 2014
despite a marked slowdown in external demand. Growth of remittance
inflows to Bangladesh picked up to about 20 percent year on year in the
second half of 2012, following a strong rise in overseas employment
earlier in the year.
The outlook for LDCs entails several downside risks. A more pronounced deterioration in the global economic environment would negatively affect primary commodity exporters through falling terms of trade, while others may be affected by falling worker remittances. Falling aid flows are expected to limit external financing options for LDCs in the outlook. |
|
GDP is forecast to grow at 0.6 per cent in 2013 and 0.8 per cent in 2014, down from 1.5 per cent in 2012.
Spillover effects from developed countries and domestic issues dampen growth in developing countries
The economic woes of the
developed countries are spilling over to
developing countries and economies in transition through weaker demand
for their exports and heightened volatility in capital flows and
commodity prices. Their
problems are also home-grown, however; growth
in investment spending has slowed significantly, presaging
a continued
deceleration of future output growth if not counteracted by
additional
policy measures. Several of the major developing economies that have
seen fast growth in recent decades are starting to face structural
bottlenecks, including fi
nancing constraints faced by local governments regarding investment
projects in some sectors of the economy, and overinvestment leading to
excess production capacity in others, as in the case of China (see
“Uncertainties and risks” section).
Figure I.3a
The vicious cycle of developed economies
<<<------>>> | High unemployment | <<<------>>> | ||||||||||||||||||||
Fiscal austerity & sovereign debt risk<<<------>>> | Low-growth trap | <<<------>>>Deleveraging by firms & households | ||||||||||||||||||||
Financial sector fragility | <<<------>>> |
Feeble policy efforts to break the vicious cycle
Fed quantitative easing |
Continued EU austerity |
|||||||||||||||||||
<<<------>>> | High unemployment | <<<------>>> | ||||||||||||||||||
Fiscal austerity & sovereign debt risk | <<<------>>> | Low-growth trap | <<<------>>> | Deleveraging by firms & households | ||||||||||||||||
ECB outright monetary transactions |
Financial sector fragility | <<<------>>> | Debt dynamics |
Source: UN/DESA
On average, economies in
Africa are forecast to see a slight moderation
in output growth in 2013 to 4.8 percent, down from 5.0 percent in 2012.
Major factors underpinning this continued growth trajectory include the
strong performance of oil-exporting countries, continued fiscal
spending in infrastructure projects, and expanding economic ties with
Asian economies. However, Africa remains plagued by numerous
challenges, including armed confl icts in various parts of the region.
Growth of income per capita will continue, but at a pace considered
insufficient to achieve substantial poverty reduction.
Infrastructure shortfalls are among the major obstacles to more dynamic economic development in most economies of the region.
The economies in developing Asia have weakened considerably during 2012 as the region’s growth engines, China and India, both shifted into lower gear. While a significant deceleration in exports has been a key factor for the slowdown, the effects of policy
tightening in the previous two years also linger. Domestic investment has softened markedly.
Both China and India face a number of structural challenges hampering growth (see below). India’s space for more policy stimulus seems limited. China and other countries in the region possess greater space for additional stimulus, but thus far have refrained from
using it. In the outlook, growth for East Asia is forecast to pick up mildly to 6.2 percent in 2013, from 5.8 percent estimated for 2012. GDP growth in South Asia is expected to average 5.0 percent in 2013, up from 4.4 percent of 2012, but still well below potential.
Infrastructure shortfalls are among the major obstacles to more dynamic economic development in most economies of the region.
The economies in developing Asia have weakened considerably during 2012 as the region’s growth engines, China and India, both shifted into lower gear. While a significant deceleration in exports has been a key factor for the slowdown, the effects of policy
tightening in the previous two years also linger. Domestic investment has softened markedly.
Both China and India face a number of structural challenges hampering growth (see below). India’s space for more policy stimulus seems limited. China and other countries in the region possess greater space for additional stimulus, but thus far have refrained from
using it. In the outlook, growth for East Asia is forecast to pick up mildly to 6.2 percent in 2013, from 5.8 percent estimated for 2012. GDP growth in South Asia is expected to average 5.0 percent in 2013, up from 4.4 percent of 2012, but still well below potential.
Contrasting trends are found in
Western Asia. Most oil-exporting
countries experienced robust growth supported by record-high oil
revenues and government spending.
By contrast, economic activity weakened in oil-importing countries, burdened by higher import bills, declining external demand and shrinking policy space. As a result, oil-exporting and oil-importing economies are facing a dual track growth outlook. Meanwhile, social unrest and political instability, notably in the Syrian Arab Republic, continue to elevate the risk assessment for the entire region. On average, GDP growth in the region is expected to decelerate to 3.3 percent in 2012 and 2013, from 6.7 percent in 2011.
GDP growth in Latin America and the Caribbean decelerated notably during 2012, led by weaker export demand. In the outlook, subject to the risks of a further downturn, the baseline projection is for a return to moderate economic growth rates, led by stronger economic performance in Brazil. For the region as whole, GDP growth is forecast to average 3.9 percent in the baseline for 2013, compared to 3.1 percent in 2012.
Among economies in transition, growth in the economies of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has continued in 2012, although it moderated in the second half of the year. Firm commodity prices, especially those of oil and natural gas, held up growth among energy-exporting economies, including Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation. In contrast, growth in the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine was adversely affected by the economic crisis in the euro area. The economies of small energy-importing countries in the CIS were supported by private remittances. In the outlook, GDP for the CIS is expected to grow by 3.8 percent in 2013, the same as in 2012. The prospects for most transition economies in South-Eastern Europe in the short run remain challenging, owing to their close ties with the euro area through trade and finance. In these economies, GDP growth is expected to average 1.2 percent in 2013, a mild rebound from the recession of 2012 when economies in the subregion shrank by 0.6 percent.
By contrast, economic activity weakened in oil-importing countries, burdened by higher import bills, declining external demand and shrinking policy space. As a result, oil-exporting and oil-importing economies are facing a dual track growth outlook. Meanwhile, social unrest and political instability, notably in the Syrian Arab Republic, continue to elevate the risk assessment for the entire region. On average, GDP growth in the region is expected to decelerate to 3.3 percent in 2012 and 2013, from 6.7 percent in 2011.
GDP growth in Latin America and the Caribbean decelerated notably during 2012, led by weaker export demand. In the outlook, subject to the risks of a further downturn, the baseline projection is for a return to moderate economic growth rates, led by stronger economic performance in Brazil. For the region as whole, GDP growth is forecast to average 3.9 percent in the baseline for 2013, compared to 3.1 percent in 2012.
Among economies in transition, growth in the economies of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has continued in 2012, although it moderated in the second half of the year. Firm commodity prices, especially those of oil and natural gas, held up growth among energy-exporting economies, including Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation. In contrast, growth in the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine was adversely affected by the economic crisis in the euro area. The economies of small energy-importing countries in the CIS were supported by private remittances. In the outlook, GDP for the CIS is expected to grow by 3.8 percent in 2013, the same as in 2012. The prospects for most transition economies in South-Eastern Europe in the short run remain challenging, owing to their close ties with the euro area through trade and finance. In these economies, GDP growth is expected to average 1.2 percent in 2013, a mild rebound from the recession of 2012 when economies in the subregion shrank by 0.6 percent.
Lower greenhouse gas emissions, but far cry from “low-carbon” growth
Helped by
weaker global economic growth, greenhouse gases (GHGs)
emitted by the Annex I countries to the Kyoto Protocol are estimated to
have fallen by about 2 percent per year during 2011-2012 (see annex
table A.22). This reverses the 3 percent increase in GHG emissions by
these countries in 2010. Emissions fell by 6 percent in 2009 along with
the fallout in GDP growth associated with the Great Recession. With the
more recent decline, GHG emission reductions among Annex I countries
are back on the long-run downward trend. Given the further moderation
in global economic growth, emissions by these countries are expected to
decline further during 2013-2014.[1] As a group, Annex I countries have
already achieved the target of the Kyoto Protocol to reduce emissions
by at least 5 percent from 1990 levels during the 2008-2012 commitment
period. Several important individual countries, however, such as the
United States and Canada, are still to meet their own national targets.
At the same time, GHG emissions in many developing countries are
increasing at a rapid pace, such that globally, emissions continue to
climb.
The world remains far from achieving its target for CO2 equivalent concentrations
In all, the world is far from being
on track to reduce emissions to the
extent considered necessary for keeping carbon dioxide (CO2) equivalent
concentrations to less than 450 parts per million (consistent with the
target of stabilizing global warming at a 2°C temperature increase,
or less, from pre-industrial levels).[2] To avoid exceeding this limit,
GHG emissions would need to drop by 80 percent by mid-century. Given
current trends and even with the extension of the Kyoto Protocol, this
is an unachievable target.
“Greener” growth pathways need to be created now, and
despite large investment costs, they would also provide opportunities
for more robust short-term recovery and global rebalancing (see
“Policy challenges” and chapter II on the environmental
costs of expanding trade through global value chains).------
1 Projections are based on past
trends in GDP growth and GHG emissions,
accounting implicitly for the effects over time of policies aimed at
decoupling (see notes to annex table A.22 for a description of the
methodology). As far as the longer-term trends are concerned, the
impact of more recent energy policy changes may not be adequately refl
ected.
2 A recent study by
PricewaterhouseCoopers notes that “since
2000, the
rate of decarbonisation has averaged 0.8% globally, a fraction of the
required reduction. From 2010 to 2011, global carbon intensity
continued this trend, falling by just 0.7%. Because of this slow start,
global carbon intensity now needs to be cut by an average of 5.1% a
year from now to 2050…. This rate of reduction has not been
achieved in
any of the past 50 years”. (See PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP,
“Too late
for two degrees? Low carbon economy index 2012”, November 2012,
pp.
2-3, available from
http://preview.thenewsmarket.com/Previews/PWC/DocumentAssets/261179_v2.pdf).
----Job crisis continues
Unemployment remains high in developed economies
Unemployment remains elevated in many developed economies, with the situation in Europe being the most challenging. A double-dip recession in several European economies has taken a heavy toll on labour markets. The unemployment rate continued to climb to a record high in the euro area during 2012, up by more than one percentage point from one year ago.
Conditions are
worse in Spain and Greece, where more
than a quarter of
the working population is without a job and more
than half of the youth
is unemployed. Only a few
economies in the region, such as Austria,
Germany, Luxembourg
and the Netherlands,
register low unemployment
rates of about 5 percent. Unemployment
rates in Central and Eastern
Europe also edged up slightly in 2012, partly resulting
from fiscal
austerity. Japan’s unemployment rate retreated to below 5
percent. In the United States, the unemployment rate stayed above 8
percent for the most part of 2012, but dropped to just below that level
from September onwards. However, the
labour participation rate is at a
record low, while the
shares of longterm unemployment reached historic
highs of 40.6 percent (jobless for 6
months or longer) and 31.4
percent
(one year
or longer). Long-term
unemployment is also severe in
the EU
and
Japan, where four
of each ten of the unemployed have been without a
job for more than one year. For the group
of developed countries as a
whole, the incidence
of long-term unemployment (over one year)
stood
at
more than 35 percent by July 2012, affecting
about 17 million workers.
Such a
prolonged duration of unemployment tends to have significant,
long-lasting detrimental impacts on both the individuals who have lost
their jobs and on the economy as a whole. The skills of
unemployed
workers deteriorate commensurate with the duration of their
unemployment, most likely leading
to lower earnings for those
individuals who are eventually able to find new jobs. At the
aggregate
level, the
higher the proportion of workers trapped in protracted
unemployment, the
greater the adverse impact on the productivity of the
economy in the medium to long run.
Adequate job creation should be a key policy priority in developed economies.
If economic growth stays as anaemic in developed countries as projected in the baseline forecast, employment rates will not return to pre-crisis levels until far beyond 2016 (figure I.4).
The employment situation varies across developing countries
Figure I.4
Post-recession employment recovery in the United States, euro area and developed economies, 2007 (Q1)-2011 (Q2) and projections for 2012 (Q3)-2016 (Q4)
Source: UN/DESA, based on data from ILO and IMF.
Note: The chart shows percentage
changes of total employment (as a
moving average) with respect to prerecession peaks. Projections (dashed
lines) are based on estimates of the output elasticity of employment
(Okun’s law), following a similar methodology to that of ILO,
World of Work Report 2011 (Geneva).
The employment situation varies
significantly across developing
countries, but the common challenges are to improve the quality of
employment and reduce vulnerable employment as well as confront
structural unemployment issues such as high youth unemployment and
gender disparities in employment—all of which are key social and
economic concerns in many developing countries.
Among
developing countries, the unemployment rates in most economies
in
East Asia and Latin America have already retreated to, or dropped
below, levels seen prior to the global financial crisis. The growth
moderation in late 2011 and 2012 has so far not led to a discernible
rise in the unemployment rate in these two regions — a positive
sign, with the caveat that a rise in the unemployment rate would
usually lag in an economic downturn. If the growth
slowdown continues,
the
unemployment rate could be expected to increase significantly. In
Africa, despite relatively strong GDP growth, the
employment situation
remains a major problem across the region, both in terms of the
level
of employment and the quality of jobs that are generated. Labour
conflicts also constitute a major downside risk to the economic
performance
of the region. Gender
disparity in employment remains acute in Africa
as well as in South Asia. Women
are facing unemployment rates at least
double those of men in some African countries, and the female
labour
force participation rate in India and Pakistan is much lower than that
of males. Social
unrest in North Africa and West Asia has been caused
in part by high unemployment, especially among youth. The
related
disruptions in economic activity, in turn, have further pushed up
unemployment rates in some countries. Among economies in transition,
the unemployment rate in the Russian Federation declined to a record
low of 5.2 percent in August 2012, partly as a result of increased
public spending, but also because of a shrinking active population.
Notable
job creation has also been recorded in Kazakhstan, but the
unemployment
rate has increased in Ukraine as a result of tighter
fiscal policy and weaker external sector.
Inflation receding worldwide, but still a concern in some developing countries
Inflation remains subdued in most developed economies...
Inflation rates remain subdued
in most developed economies.
Continuing large output gaps and downward pressure on wages in many
countries are keeping Inflationary expectations low. Inflation in the
United States moderated over 2012, down to about 2 percent from 3.1
percent in 2011. A further
moderation in headline Inflation is expected
in the outlook for 2013. In
the euro area, headline Inflation, as
measured by the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), continues
to be above the central bank’s target of 2 percent. Core
Inflation, which does not include price changes in volatile items such
as energy, food, alcohol and tobacco, has been much lower at around 1.5
percent, with no evidence of upward pressures. In the outlook,
Inflation
is expected to drift down slowly. Inflation in the new EU
members is also expected to lessen. Deflation
continues to prevail in
Japan, although the central bank has raised its Inflation target
to
boost Inflation expectations.
... and is receding in most developing countries, although still high in some
Inflation receded in a majority
of developing countries during
2012, but remains stubbornly high in some. In
the outlook, higher oil
prices and some country-specific supply-side constraints may continue
to put upward pressure on Inflation in developing countries in 2013
and
into 2014. In
Africa, while Inflation moderated in many economies, the
rate of Inflation is still above 10 percent in Angola, Nigeria and
elsewhere. Inflation is expected to remain subdued in most of East
Asia, but is still a concern for most countries in South Asia where
Inflation rates were, on average, over 11 percent in 2012 and are
forecast to remain above or near 10 percent in 2013 and 2014. Inflation
remains low in most economies in West Asia, though it is still high
(above 10 per cent) in Yemen and very high (30 percent) in the Syrian
Arab Republic. The Inflation rate in Latin America and the Caribbean is
expected to stay at about 6 percent.
Outlook for global commodity and financial markets
World trade
slowed notably during 2012, along with weaker global
output. The
sovereign debt crisis and economic
recession in the euro
area and continued
financial deleveraging in most developed economies
affected
capital flows to emerging markets and other developing
countries, adding
to uncertainty about economic prospects and enhancing
market volatility. These factors,
combined
with spillover effects of
expansionary monetary policies in developed economies, have
also fueled
volatility in primary commodity prices and exchange rates.
Global
imbalances, characterized by large savings surpluses in some economies
and deficits in others, have narrowed markedly in the aftermath of the
global financial crisis. However, the rebalancing has hardly been a
benign process, having resulted mainly from demand deflation and
weaker trade flows.
Sharp slowdown of world trade
Declining import demand in Europe dampened world trade growth in 2012
After plunging by more than 10
percent in the Great Recession of 2009,
world trade rebounded strongly in 2010. Since 2011,
the
recovery of the
volume of world exports has lost momentum (figure I.5). Growth
of
world trade decelerated sharply during 2012, mainly owing to
declining
import demand in Europe, as the
region entered into its second
recession in three years, and anaemic
aggregate demand in the United
States and Japan. Developing countries and economies in
transition have
seen demand for their exports weaken as a result.
Figure I.5
World merchandise exports volume, January 2006-August 2012
Source: CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, rebased by UN/DESA
The monthly
trade data of different regions and countries showed a
clear sequence of the weakening demand that originated
in the euro area
transmitting
to the rest of the world. Import demand in Greece, Italy,
Portugal and Spain started to decline in late 2011 and fell further
during 2012, but the
weakness in trade activity has spread further to
the rest of Europe as well, including France and Germany. In
tandem,
imports of the United States and Japan also slowedsignificantly in the
second half of 2012.
East Asian
economies that trade
significantly with the major developed
countries have
experienced commensurate declines in exports. For
example, the Republic of
Korea, and Taiwan Province
of China registered
considerable drops in exports during 2012. China’s
exports also
decelerated notably. Further down
the global value chain, energy
and
other primary-exporting economies have seen demand for their exports
weaken as well. Brazil and the Russian
Federation, for instance, all
registered export declines in varying degrees in the second half of
2012. Lower export
earnings, compounded by
domestic demand constraints
have also
pushed down GDP growth in many developing countries and
economies in transition during 2012. This has led to flagging
import
demand from these economies, further slowing trade of developed
countries.
At the same time, a rise in
international protectionism, albeit modest,
and the protracted impasse in the world multilateral trade
negotiations, have also adversely
affected international trade
flows.[3] In the outlook
for 2013 and 2014, the continued weak global
growth outlook and heightened uncertainties lead to expectations that
world trade will continue to expand at a rather tepid pace of 4.3
percent in volume terms in 2013 and 4.9 percent in 2014, compared to
3.3 percent in 2012 and 6.8 percent during 2005-2008.
---------------[3]
3 See MDG Gap Task Force Report 2012: The Global Partnership for Development—Making Rhetoric a Reality (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.12.I.5).
----------------
Oil prices soften but risk premium remains
Oil prices fluctuated in 2012, with weaker demand off setting geopolitical risks
The price of oil fluctuated during
2012 (figure I.6); weaker global
demand tended to push prices down, while heightened geopolitical risks
in several oil-producing countries put upward pressure on prices.
Global oil demand decelerated somewhat to 0.9 percent in 2012. Global
supply was affected by sanctions imposed by the EU and the United
States on Syrian and Iranian oil exports. This was compensated to a
large extent, however, by the preventive increase in oil production in
Saudi Arabia, the resumption of production in Libya and
higher-than-expected output in North America, Latin America and the
Russian Federation. Yet, spare capacity dropped to 2.8 million barrels
per day (mbd), down from an average of about 4 mbd during 2006-2011.
In the outlook, world oil demand is expected to remain subdued during 2013 and 2014. Supply is expected to further expand in several oil-producing areas, including North America, the Russian Federation and Brazil, partially off set by declines in the North Sea and Central Asia. Saudi Arabia is expected to lower production, thereby increasing spare capacity.
Continued geopolitical tensions in
the Middle East will likely continue
to put a risk premium on prices, however. As a result, Brent oil prices
are forecast to decline somewhat and fl uctuate around $105 per barrel
(pb) in 2013-2014, down from an average of $110 pb in 2012.
Figure I.6
Brent oil price, January 2000-October 2012
Source: UN/DESA.
Rising food prices
Food prices increased to a record high, but will moderate in 2013
Figure I.7
Daily grain prices, January 2007-October 2012
Source: International Grains Council
Despite slowing global demand, food
prices jumped to a record high in
July 2012 (figure I.7). Global cereal production in 2012 is expected
to fall by 2.7 percent from previous year’s record crop. The
overall decrease reflects a 5.5 percent
reduction in wheat, and a 2.5
percent decline in coarse grains, while the global rice
crop is seen to
grow by 0.7 percent above last season’s record. Severe
droughts
and poor weather this year in the United States, the Russian
Federation, Ukraine and Kazakhstan have been the main cause of the
reduced maize and wheat crops. According to
the Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO), the decline
would also reduce the world cereal
stock-to-use ratio from 22.6 percent in 2012 to 20.6 percent in
2013,
which compares with the low of 19.2 percent registered in 2007-2008.[4]
----------------------
[4] Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, “World cereal production in 2012 down 2.7 percent from the 2011 record”, FAO Cereal Supply and Demand Brief, 8 November 2012, available from http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/wfs-home/csdb/en/.
----------------------
The situation
is not yet considered a threat to global food
security, however. In the outlook,
food
prices will likely moderate
somewhat with slowing global demand. However, given that markets
are very tight, even
relatively minor supply shocks may easily cause
new price spikes.
Softening non-food commodity prices
Metal and ore prices will remain weak as a result of subdued demand
The prices of non-oil, non-food
commodities started to decline in the
second quarter of 2012 as a result of the slowdown in global demand
(figure I.8). The appreciation of the United States dollar has also
contributed to the weakness in the prices of non-food commodities, as
these prices are dollar-denominated. Prices of base metals and ores
continued their downward trend until mid-2012, before rebounding
somewhat towards the end of the year, mainly influenced by financial
factors (see chapter II). Global demand remained
weak, while new mining
projects implemented over the past decade have increased global supply.
Figure I.8
Non-oil commodity prices, 2000-2014
The prices of
metals and ores are likely to remain weak, as global
demand is not expected to pick up quickly during 2013. Market
conditions are likely to remain volatile, however.
New rounds of
monetary easing by major developed economies in a context
of continued financial fragility, for instance, would
likely induce
more speculative financial flows into commodity markets, thereby
keeping
prices up and bringing more volatility into the market.
Continued volatility of capital flows to emerging markets
Emerging markets will continue to experience volatile capital flows
Global
financial vulnerabilities remain unabatedly high. Bank lending
has remained sluggish across developed economies. Financial
conditions
are likely to remain very fragile over the near term because of
the
time
it will take to implement a solution to the euro area crisis and
the
shadow being cast over the recovery of the United States economy by
the fiscal cliff . Most emerging markets are likely to continue
experiencing volatile capital flows as they have over the past few
years, strongly influenced by fragility in financial markets and QE
policies in developed countries (figure I.9).
For the year 2012, net private
capital inflows to emerging markets
—that is, selected developing countries and economies in
transition—are estimated to reach about $1 trillion, down by
about 10 percent from the previous year.[5] Next to ongoing
deleveraging in developed countries, domestic factors specific to
emerging market economies added to the downward pressure on net capital
infl ows in the first half of 2012. Slower growth in China and a few
other Asian economies has lowered exchange-rate adjusted rate-of-return
expectations of international investors. In North Africa and the Middle
East, uncertainties remain in the wake of political transformations
and, in some cases, ongoing conflicts, creating an adverse environment
for stronger capital infl ows. Several Latin American countries, such
as Brazil, have introduced more rigorous capital account regulation to
limit short-term capital inflows and mitigate capital-flow and
exchange-rate volatility.
-----------------
5 Institute of International Finance, “Capital fl ows to emerging market economies”, IIF Research Note, 13 October 2012. Data referring to private capital fl ows in this section cover about 30 emerging market economies and discuss net capital infl ows separate from net outfl ows. In this sense the data diff er from those presented in chapter III, which cover all developing and transition economies and apply the “net net fl ow” concept, that is net infl ows less net outfl ows.
---------------------
Figure I.9
Net capital flows to emerging markets
Billions of dollars
Greek crisis
Irish crisis
First ECB
LRTO
Source: IMF, WEO database, October 2012.
The costs of external borrowing fi nancing increased for developing countries and economies in transition when the crisis in the euro area escalated in mid-2012, but have since decreased and remain low in general (figure I.10).
Figure I.10
Daily yield spreads on emerging market bonds, January 2007-October 2012
percentage points
Africa
Asia
Latin America
Europe
Source: JPMorgan Chase
Net private capital inflows to
emerging markets are not expected to
increase by much on average in 2013, although volatility in markets
would persist. New rounds of monetary easing announced by the central
banks of developed countries are expected to provide some stabilizing
impact on financial markets, which may help reduce risk aversion among
investors. In view of the interest rate and growth differentials,
investors are expected to retain interests in developing countries. At
the same time, however, the continued need for deleveraging the bank
system in developed countries keeps the risk of capital reversals high
for emerging markets. Furthermore, uncertainties surround future growth
prospects for some large developing economies (see “Uncertainties
and risks” section), which could temper appetite for foreign
investments in emerging markets.
Capital inflows continue to be accompanied by large scale capital outflows from emerging markets
Volatile capital infl ows continue to
be accompanied by large-scale
capital outfl ows from emerging markets. Emerging market economies
invested $1.3 trillion abroad in 2012, mostly associated with further
increases in foreign exchange reserve holdings.
Even though the degree of reserve
accumulation was slightly less than
in 2011, it signals continued concerns in emerging and developing
country economies regarding world commodity and capital market
volatility. While providing buffers against shocks and policy space to
mitigate exchange-rate volatility, the massive reserve accumulation is
also further weakening global demand. [6]
--------------[6] See, for example, the discussion in World Economic and Social Survey 2010: Retooling Global Development (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.10.II.C.1), chap V.
---------
Net ODA flows from member countries
of the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) reached $133.5 billion in 2011, up from $128.5
billion in 2010. In real terms, however, this represented a fall of 3
percent, widening the delivery gap in meeting internationally agreed
aid targets to $167 billion.[7] Preliminary results from the
OECD survey of donors’ forward spending plans indicate that
Country Programmable Aid (CPA)—a core subset of aid that includes
programmes and projects, which have predicted trends in total
aid—is expected to increase by about 6 percent in 2012, mainly on
account of expected increases in outfl ows of soft loans from
multilateral agencies that had benefi ted from earlier fund
replenishments.
However, CPA is expected to stagnate
from 2013 to 2015, reflecting the
delayed impact of the global economic crisis on donor country fiscal
budgets.
------------[7] MDG Gap Task Force Report 2012, op. cit.
---------------
Continued exchange-rate volatility
Exchange rates between major currencies remained relatively calm in response to QE measures
A large
depreciation of the euro vis-à-vis other major
currencies was the defining trend in global foreign exchange
markets
for the first half of 2012 (figure I.11), driven
by the escalation of
the debt crisis in the euro area. The euro rebounded somewhat in
the
second half of the year after the European authorities announced some
new initiatives, including the OMT programme. The exchange rates
between major currencies remained relatively calm in response to
announcements of the OMT and further QE by the European Central Bank
(ECB) and the Fed. In the outlook, given announced monetary policies in
major developed economies and their generally weak growth prospects, it
is diffi cult to ascertain a clear trend in the exchange rates among
the major currencies.
Figure I.11
Exchange rates of major currencies vis-à-vis the United States dollar, January 2002-October 2012
Inde:x 2, January 2002 =100
Euro
Japanese yen
Swiss franc
Source: UN/DESA, based on data from JPMorgan Chase
After a precipitous fall in late
2011, the first half of 2012 saw
currencies in most developing countries and the economies in transition
depreciating further against the United States dollar (figure I.12).
This trend was driven by two main factors: the reduction in capital
infl ows to these countries and the weaker growth prospects for these
economies. Since mid-2012, the exchange rates of most of these
currencies have stabilized, and some of them started to rebound after
the launches of the new QE in major developed countries. In the
outlook, continued implementation of the open-ended QE in major
developed countries will
likely increase the volatility in the exchange
rates of the currencies of developing countries and the
economies in
transition.
Figure I.12
Exchange rates of selected developing country currencies vis-à-vis the United States dollar, January 2002-October 2012
Brazilian real
Korean won
South African rand
Source: UN/DESA, based on data from JPMorgan Chase.
No benign global rebalancing
External imbalances have fallen as a result of overall weakness in global demand
Global imbalances, which refers to
the current-account imbalances
across major economies, have narrowed significantly in the aftermath of
the global crisis. Even if widening slightly during 2012, they remain
much smaller than in the years leading up to the crisis (figure I.13).
Unfortunately,
this
trend cannot be seen as a sign of greater global
financial stability and more balanced growth. External
imbalances have
fallen as a result of overall weakness in global demand and the
synchronized downturn in international trade rather than through more
structural shifts in savings rates and demand patterns.
The United States remained the
largest deficit economy, with an
estimated external deficit of about $467 billion (3.1 percent of GDP)
in 2012, down substantially External imbalances have fallen as a result
of overall weakness in global demand from the peak of $800 billion (6
percent of GDP) registered in 2006. In mirror image, the external
surpluses in China, Germany, Japan and a group of fuel-exporting
countries have narrowed, albeit to varying degrees. China recorded an
estimated surplus of slightly over 2 percent of GDP in 2012, a sharp
decline from a high of 10 percent of GDP in 2007.
Japan is expected to register a
surplus of 4 percent of GDP in 2012,
also a signifi cant reduction from its peak level of 5.0 percent of GDP
reached in 2007. While Germany’s surplus declined only slightly,
remaining above 5 percent of GDP, the current account for the euro area
as a whole turned from a deficit into a surplus of 1 percent of GDP.
Large surpluses relative to GDP are still present in oil-exporting
countries, reaching 20 percent of GDP or more in some of those in
Western Asia.
Figure I.13
Global imbalances, 1997-2014
Curreent, account balances as a percentage of world gross product
World Economic Situation and Prospects 2013
The larger part of the adjustment reflects demand deflation in the global economy.
In the United
States, following several years of rebounding exports,
both export
and import demand weakened markedly in 2012. The
corresponding narrowing of the saving investment gap reflects a small
decline
in the savings rate and significant moderation in investment
demand. The household
saving rate, which increased from about 2.0
percent of disposable household income before the financial crisis to
about 5.0 percent in the past few years, has started
to fall again to
about 3.8 percent. The investment rate fell from 19.2 percent in
2007
to 16.4 percent of GDP in 2012. The government budget defi cit dropped
from 10.1 percent of GDP in 2011 to 8.7 percent in 2012, mainly as a
result of further cuts in government spending, not increased government
revenue. In the outlook, a further narrowing of the current-account
defi cit is expected in the United States in 2013 as a result of
weakness caused by similar adjustments.
The decline in the external surplus of China was driven by a drop in export growth
In the surplus
countries, the decline in the
external surplus of China
has mainly been driven by a significant drop in the growth of its
exports caused
by the weaker global economy, rather than a
strengthening of imports pushed by domestic rebalancing.
Both exports and
imports in China decelerated
substantially in 2012,
even as China’s exchange-rate policy has become more flexible.
The Government has stepped up measures aiming to boost household
consumption and rebalance the structure of the economy towards greater
reliance on domestic demand, but thus far this has not resulted in any
visible increase in the share consumption in GDP. The corresponding
narrowing of the saving-investment ratio in Chinacame mainly from a
notable slowdown in the growth of investment, rather than a
reduction
in saving brought on by increased consumption.
In Japan,
the narrowing of its external surplus has, to some extent,
reflected the strengthening of its domestic demand — including
increased imports of oil related to reconstruction in the aftermath of
the devastating earthquake — but also a significant
slowdown in
exports.
The surpluses
in oil-exporting countries are of quite a different
nature as these countries will need to share the wealth generated by
the endowment of oil with future generations through a continued
accumulation of surpluses in the foreseeable future. Yet, some
studies
warn of a slowdown in oil exports for the Russian Federation in the
medium run.[8]
--------------[8]8 See Ernst & Young, “The future of Russian oil exploration: Beyond 2025”, available from http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Perspectives-of-Oil-and-Gas-explorations-2011-EN/$FILE/Perspectives-of-Oil-and-Gas-explorations-2011-EN.pdf.
----------------
In the euro area,
the current-account
deficits of member States in the
periphery fell dramatically as a result
of fiscal austerity and the
severe contraction of private investment and consumption demand.
Smaller
current-account deficits were accompanied
by large
financial
outflows triggered
by panic in the banking sector of debt-distressed
countries of the euro area. This reflects a
stark reversal of the
European economic integration process of past decades, when
capital flowed from the core members to the peripheral members. In Germany,
room
remains for policies to stimulate more domestic demand so as to further
narrow its external surplus.
Persistent global imbalances have induced wide imbalances in net asset and liability positions
Global
imbalances persist, inducing wide imbalances in net asset and
liability positions. The latest data show that the net external
liability position of the United States widened to a record $4 trillion
(more than 25 percent of GDP) in 2011, a significant increase from $2.5
trillion in the previous year (figure I.14). The foreign assets owned
by the United States totalled about $21 trillion by the end of 2011,
while assets in the United States owned by the rest of the world
totalled about $25 trillion.[9] Given the trends in global financial
markets in 2012 and the current-account deficit trends discussed above,
the net external liability position of the United States is estimated
to have increased further during 2012.
-----------[9]The United States acquisitions of
foreign assets increased by about
$484 billion during the year, but valuation adjustments lowered the
value of foreign assets owned by the United States by $702 billion,
mostly from decreases in prices of foreign stocks. On the other hand,
foreign acquisitions of the assets in the United States increased by
about $1 trillion, and valuation adjustments raised the value of
foreign-owned assets in the United States by $353 billion, mostly from
price increases of the United States Treasury bonds. In short, the
large increase in the net external liability position of the United
States during 2011 mainly refl ected a substantial change in the
valuation of the assets and liability, with net fl ows accounting for a
smaller part.
--------Given current trends, the global
imbalances are not expected to widen
by a margin significant enough in the coming two years as to become an
imminent threat to the stability of the global economy. However, the
large net liability position of the United States poses a continued
risk to the medium-term stability of exchange rates among major
currencies, as investors and monetary authorities holding large
dollar-reserve holdings may fear a strong depreciation of the dollar
over time and which would accelerate such a process in possible
disorderly fashion. Should the global economy fall into another
recession, the imbalances could narrow further through demand
deflation. It would thus seem that international policy coordination
should
not have the rebalancing of current-account positions as its primary
focus in the short term, but rather should give
priority to concerted
efforts to reinvigorate the global recovery, job creation
and greater
policy coherence to break out of the vicious circles.
Figure I.14
Net international investment position in the United States
Billions of dollars
Source: UN/DESA, based on United States Bureau of Economic Analysis data.
Note: Data for 2009 and 2010 has been revised; data for 2011 is preliminary.
World Economic Situation and Prospects 2013
-------
Uncertainties and risks
The baseline outlook presented above is subject to major uncertainties and risks, mostly on the downside. The economic crisis in the euro area could continue to worsen and become more disruptive. The United States could fail to avert a fiscal cliff. The slowdown in a number of large developing countries, including China, could well deteriorate further, potentially ending in a “hard landing”. Geopolitical tensions in West Asia and elsewhere in the world might spiral out of control. Given dangerously low stock-use ratios of basic grains, world food prices may easily spike with any significant weather shock and take a toll on the more vulnerable and poorest countries in the world. The discussion in this section focuses on the likelihood of the occurrence of the first three of these risks and what impact there would be on the global economy should they materialize.
Risk of a deeper crisis in the euro area
The euro area crisis continues to be the biggest threat to global growth
The crisis in the euro area continues to loom as the largest threat to global growth. The economies in the euro area have been suffering from entanglement in a number of vicious circles. The dangerous dynamics between sovereign debt distress and banking sector fragility are deteriorating the balance sheets of both Governments and commercial banks. The fiscal austerity responses are exacerbating the economic downturn, inspiring self-defeating efforts at fiscal consolidation and pushing up debt ratios, thereby triggering further budget cuts.
As a result, the region has already fallen into another recession three years after the global Great Recession of 2009, with unemployment rates rising to record highs since the debut of the euro. The situation in Greece remains particularly dire, despite the fact that fears of an imminent exit from the monetary union have eased and Greek government bond yields have subsequently retreated from their peaks following the debt restructuring in early 2012. GDP continues to plunge, however, even after having already fallen by nearly 20 percent since 2007. Unless the troika of the EU, the ECB and the IMF relax the terms of conditionality on the target and the time span of Greek fiscal adjustment, and also provide more support, the economy will be unable to extricate itself from the present crisis any time soon.
The focus of attention shifted towards Spain in mid-2012. Spain is the fourth largest economy of the euro area, with a GDP twice the size of Greece, Ireland and Portugal combined. The country’s borrowing costs surged when the Government asked for international financing to recapitalize the banks in early June 2012. Yields on 10-year sovereign bonds peaked at 7.6 percent in late July, surpassing the level Greece, Ireland and Portugal faced when they were forced to ask for international assistance to address debt distress. Financial market contagion spread to Italy, which also has seen significant increases in sovereign borrowing costs.
These developments posed heightened systemic risks for the monetary union.
In response,
the ECB
announced a new OMT programme in September through
which it can make potentially unlimited purchases of sovereign bonds
with a maturity of three years or shorter issued by selected
debt-distressed countries. The OMT
programme aims to reduce borrowing
costs for these countries. However,
the
ECB can only purchase bonds
under the OMT programme if
countries have applied for international
assistance via both
the
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)
and the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which
comes with policy
conditionality attached.
After the announcement, sovereign yields of Spain and a few other countries retreated substantially (figure I.15). In late September, Spanish authorities presented a budget that aims to cut the projected 2013 deficit by €40 billion ($51.4 billion). Government spending is to be cut by 8.9 percent, while public infrastructure spending is to drop from 1.3 percent to 0.89 percent of GDP, among other austerity measures. A recent bank stress test showed a capital shortfall of €59.3 billion for Spanish banks. It will be feasible to repair this with the €100 billion in European aid the Spanish Government has already requested for recapitalization of its banks.
The OMT programme of the ECB could significantly reduce debt refi nancing costs, but uncertainties remain
The OMT
programme initiated by the ECB, if implemented
as planned,
potentially
could significantly reduce debt refinancing costs for
Spain and debt-distressed euro area countries. Uncertainties
remain,
however, on a number of issues unfolding in the future. For example,
the agreement made earlier by euro area leaders to directly
recapitalize Spanish banks without increasing the country’s
sovereign debt was considered to be a key initiative to effectively
short-circuit the vicious
feedback between sovereign debt and bank
fragility. Subsequently, however, some euro area
member countries have
voiced a somewhat different interpretation in that the direct
bank
recapitalization would work only for banks getting into trouble in the
future, not for those being rescued under the current programme
for
Spain. If this interpretation would hold in practice, Spain’s
government deficit would be much higher than originally projected and
could trigger severe additional fiscal adjustment.
Figure I.15
Yields on two-year government bonds of selected euro area countries, January 2010-October 2012
Percentage points
Germany
Greece (right-hand scale)
Ireland
Portugal
Spain
Source: JPMorgan Chase.
World Economic Situation and Prospects 2013
---------------
Question remains as to whether Spain actually needs such deep budget cuts.
In contrast with Greece, some analysts argue that Spain’s woes started in the private sector as the housing bubble burst, drastically reducing government tax revenue and prompting a rescue of banks. Before that, the Government had relatively low debt levels and a modest deficit. From this perspective, fiscal austerity would not address the root cause of the problem in Spain, but only exacerbate the economic downturn and cause more unemployment.
The announced policy initiatives seem to be insufficient to break the downward spiral
In any case, even if the policy initiatives announced to date are implemented as planned, they seem to be insufficient to break the downward spiral many euro area members face in the short run and inadequate to boost a solid growth in the medium run.Given all the uncertainties and risks, a number of researchers have already studied the scenarios and economic ramifications of the possible exit of some euro area members.[10] The pessimistic scenario, discussed further below, does not assume any break-up of the euro area or the exit of any of its members, however. The real implications of such an event are extremely difficult to gauge because of the large amount of financial market uncertainty that would arise and the complex, but as yet unknown, set of institutional rearrangements that would result.
[10] Global Insight estimates that an exit of Greece would come with substantial international spillover effects. It estimates that the simulated output loss for the United States could be as much as 2.5 percent, pushing the economy into recession in 2013. (See IHS Global Insight, “US Executive Summary”, November 2012). Oxford Economics (“Central banks take out additional insurance”, Global Scenario Service, September 2012) estimates that an exit of Greece in the third quarter of 2013 would lower euro area GDP by 3.5 percent and WGP would drop 1.3 percent below the baseline for 2014.
In a fuller euro area break-up with
Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain,
Italy, and Cyprus exiting in the first quarter of 2014, Oxford
Economics estimates output losses could be as high as 10 percent and
those for the world as a whole would also be commensurately higher.
-----------------Instead, the downside scenario
presented below looks at possibility of
a much deeper recession in the euro area than delineated in the
baseline. The further downturn could be caused by a delayed
implementation of the OMT programme and other support measures for
those members in need. Delays could occur through
political difficulties in reaching agreement between the countries in
need of assistance and the troika of EU, ECB and IMF, and/or much
larger detrimental effects of the fiscal austerity programmes
and more
difficulties in structural adjustments than anticipated in the
baseline forecast.[11]
[11] More specifically, the
scenario
of a deeper euro crisis presented
in table I.2 below assumes further
fiscal tightening in the
debt-distressed countries and no use of the OMT programme. As a
result,
bond yields and borrowing costs increase, while consumer and business
confidence drop further, affecting private consumption and investment
demand.
---------------Uncertainties about the “fiscal cliff ” in the United States
The United States may see major changes in government spending and tax policy at the end of 2012
Unless Congress can reach an
agreement to avert it, the United States
will face a sharp change in its government spending and tax policy at
the end of 2012. Because of the potentially severe implications, it has
been coined the “fiscal cliff ”. The tax cuts endorsed
during the Administration of George W. Bush worth $280 billion per year
(often referred to as the “Bush tax cuts”), the 2
percentage point payroll tax reduction worth $125 billion, and the
emergency unemployment compensation worth $40 billion introduced during
the first term of the Obama Administration, were all designed to expire
at the end of 2012. More specifi cally, the expiration of the Bush tax
cuts would imply an increase in income tax rates across all income
levels by about 5 percentage points in 2013. Among the other changes
associated with the expiration of Bush tax cuts are the phasing out of
the reduction in the Federal Child Tax Credit and an increase in the
maximum tax rate for long-term capital gains by about 5 percentage
points. The expiration of the 2-percentage point reduction in
employee payroll taxes would imply a decline in aggregate disposable
income by about $125 billion. Moreover, the expiration of emergency
unemployment compensation, which was first passed into law in 2008 and
has been extended in the past four years, would imply a reduction in
consumption spending by about $40 billion.[12] On the expenditure side,
automatic budget cuts will be activated, cutting expenditure by $98
billion.[13] Together these actions amount to a downward adjustment in
aggregate demand of no less than 4 percent of GDP.
[12] For more details, see JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, “The US fiscal
cliff : an update and a downgrade”, Economic Research Note, 18
October 2012, available from
https://mm.jpmorgan.com/EmailPubServlet?h=c7s2j110&doc=GPS-965096-0.pdf;
and Joseph Brusuelas, “Fiscal cliff ”, Bloomberg Brief, 25
September 2012, available from
http://www.bloombergbriefs.com/files/2012-9-25-Fiscal-Cliff-Special-Issue.pdf.[13] These automatic cuts are specifi
ed in the Budget Control Act
which was adopted as a result of the failure of the Joint Select
Committee on Defi cit Reduction (the so-called
“Supercommittee”) to reach an agreement in 2011 as to how
to bring the budget defi cit down to sustainable levels over the next
ten years.
---The risk was still clear and
present in the immediate aftermath of
the November 6 presidential and congressional elections in the United
States. In
the worst case, political gridlock would prevent Congress
from reaching any agreement, leading to a full-scale drop in government
spending by about $98 billion and substantial hikes in taxes amounting
to $450 billion in 2013. It is reasonable to assume that after
realizing the costs to the economy, policymakers will feel compelled to
reach an agreement on reinstating those tax reduction measures and on
ceasing the automatic spending cuts in the second half of 2013.
A hard landing of some large developing economies
Growth slowed noticeably during 2012 in a number of large developing economies, such as Brazil, China and India, which all enjoyed a long period of rapid growth prior to the global financial crisis and managed to recover quickly at a robust pace in 2010. For example, growth in Brazil dropped from a peak of 7.5 percent in 2010 to an estimated 1.3 percent in 2012;in China, from 10.4 percent to 7.7 percent; and in India, from 8.9 percent to 5.5 percent.
Given the uncertainties about their
external demand and various
domestic growth challenges, risks of further and larger-than-expected
declines in the growth of these economies are not trivial. In this
section, China
is used as an example to
illustrate such risks and their implications for these economies and
for the rest of the world.
China has seen a slowdown in exports and investment
China’s
exports continued to slow during 2012, owing to weak
demand in major developed economies. For 2012 as
whole, real exports
for China may register growth of about 5-6 percent, compared to an
average growth of about 20 percent in the past 10 years. Meanwhile,
growth in
investment, which contributed to more than 50 percent of GDP
growth in the past decades, has been
decelerating. Growth in
nominal fixed investment has declined
from 25 percent a year ago to 20 percent
currently. As fixed investment accounts for almost 50 percent of
GDP,
this
deceleration alone
will reduce
GDP growth by 2.5 percentage
points. Compared with 2009, when China’s exports dropped
by more
than 10 percent, it appears that the present deceleration in GDP growth
comes mainly on account of domestic demand.
The slowdown in investment growth in China has been driven primarily by two factors. First, the Government has adopted policies to control the risk of asset price bubbles in the housing sector, including requirements for larger down payments and limits on the number of housing units people can buy. Real estate investment, which accounts for about 25 percent of total fixed investment, increased by 15 percent in the first half of 2012, but the pace of growth was down from 33 percent recorded a year ago. Acquisition of land for home construction has been declining at an annualized pace of about 20 percent since the beginning of 2012. Because this is a key source of revenue for local governments in China, their fiscal space has been heavily reduced. Slower real estate investment growth also has considerable damaging effects on supplying industries.
Second, the central Government has become more cautious about fiscal stimulus.
Most of the 2009-2010 large-scale fiscal stimulus package, costing about 4 trillion yuan, was used for infrastructure investment and formed an important driver of economic growth in those years. However, after it was phased out in 2011, increasing concerns have been expressed in China over unintended side effects created by the stimulus and vast excess production capacity emerging in some industrial sectors. The Government seems set to put more effort into restructuring the economy, rather than trying to create more aggregate demand stimulus. This is based on the assumption that a rebalancing of the economy through an increase in the share of household consumption in GDP could compensate for a decline in the investment rate and a slowdown in exports. It assumes that with such rebalancing the economy could still grow at a robust pace of 7.5 percent (which is the official growth target for 2012). However, thus far it has proven difficult to boost consumption in the short run and, moreover, industrial restructuring and future GDP growth would require making substantial new investments today.
Furthermore, local governments have been facing financing constraints in the implementation of new projects. Fixed investment projects managed by local governments account for more than 90 percent of total fixed investment in value terms. The financing constraints have emerged because of less revenue from land sales and lack of bank lending as the banks await positive signals from the central Government.
In the downside scenario, it is assumed that growth in China would slow to about 5 percent
Because of these factors, there are substantial risks for much lower GDP growth in China. The downside scenario presented below assumes a slowdown in growth to about 5 percent per year, particularly if fixed investment growth decelerates further, subtracting another 5-10 percentage points per year in 2013-2014. Other assumptions for this alternative scenario for the Chinese economy include the central Government maintaining the tightening measures in the housing sector and no fiscal stimulus.
Risk of a double-dip global recession
Table I.2 summarizes the global economic consequences of the three scenarios discussed above, based on simulations using the United Nations World Economic Forecasting Model.
A deepening of the euro crisis would cause a loss of global output of more than 9 percent
The euro crisis scenario focuses on the relatively high risk of deeper fiscal cuts in the debt-distressed countries. For reasons mentioned above, the much worse case, but, for now, less likely scenario of a break-up of the monetary union is not considered here.
More specifically, in this first scenario, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain are expected to take further austerity measures in 2013, with deeper cuts than assumed in the baseline. As a result, the estimated output losses in these economies would be between 1 and 2 percentage points in 2013. The deeper recession is assumed to spread to other economies through trade channels and, more importantly, through greater financial uncertainty as confidence in the euro and prospects for recovery erodes further. As a result, the economy of the euro area would shrink by 0.9 percent compared with the baseline forecast for 2013, thus further deepening the euro area recession that set in throughout 2012. During 2013-2015, the cumulative output loss for the euro area as a whole would amount to 3.3 percent. The further weakening in the euro area would spill over to the rest of the world and the cumulative loss of global output would amount to 1.1 percentage points. The other developed economies, such as the United States and Japan, would all suffer notable losses. The deepening of the euro crisis would cost developing countries about 0.5 percent of GDP on average.
The fiscal cliff would have an even larger impact
In the fiscal cliff scenario, world economic growth would slow to 1.2 percent in 2013, compared to 2.4 percent in the baseline. The cumulative output loss between 2013 and 2015 would be 2.5 percentage points. The United States economy would enter into recession and Japan and the EU would also be severely affected, with output losses of about 2 percentage points during 2013-2015. Mexico and Central America would be hardest hit among developing countries, losing about 3.0 percentage points owing to close economic ties with the United States. East Asian economies would see cumulative output losses of about 1.6 percentage points.
A hard landing of the Chinese economy would also have a visible impact on the world economy
A hard landing of the Chinese economy, with GDP growth slowing to 5 percent in 2013, would also have a visible impact on the world economy. China accounts for about 8 percent of WGP and 10 percent of world trade. Compared with the baseline forecast, a 3 percentage point deceleration in the pace of growth of the Chinese economy would cause a cumulative global output loss of 1.5 percentage points during 2013-2015.
Given its close economic ties with China, Japan would be most affected, suffering a GDP loss of 1.6 percentage points. GDP of the United States and the EU would drop by 0.7 and 0.6 percentage points, respectively, over 2013-2015 compared with the baseline.
Much of their output losses would be caused by lower exports of capital goods to China.
Table I.2
Downside scenarios for the world economy
Percentage deviation from baseline GDP level
Table I.2 | Output loss (-) | |||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Deeper euro area crisis | United States fiscal cliff | Hardlanding in China | Three scenarios combined | |||||||||
2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | |
World | -0.3 | -0.7 | -1.1 | -1.2 | -2.1 | -2.5 | -0.4 | -1.0 | -1.5 | -2.2 | -4.3 | -5.9 |
Developed economies | -0.4 | -0.9 | -1.5 | -1.7 | -2.7 | -3.2 | -0.1 | -0.4 | -0.8 | -2.5 | -4.7 | -6.4 |
United States of America | -0.1 | -0.4 | -0.8 | -3.8 | -5.2 | -5.3 | -0.1 | -0.3 | -0.7 | -4.1 | -6.3 | -7.3 |
Japan | -0.2 | -0.4 | -0.6 | -0.6 | -1.2 | -2.1 | -0.4 | -0.9 | -1.6 | -1.7 | -3.5 | -5.8 |
European Union | -0.7 | -1.8 | -2.7 | -0.5 | -1.2 | -1.9 | -0.1 | -0.3 | -0.6 | -1.6 | -4.1 | -6.5 |
EU-15 | -0.7 | -1.8 | -2.8 | -0.5 | -1.2 | -2.0 | -0.1 | -0.3 | -0.6 | -1.6 | -4.2 | -6.7 |
New EU members | -0.6 | -1.1 | -1.3 | -0.2 | -0.6 | -1.1 | -0.1 | -0.3 | -0.6 | -1.4 | -2.8 | -3.7 |
Euro area | -0.9 | -2.1 | -3.3 | -0.5 | -1.2 | -1.8 | -0.1 | -0.3 | -0.6 | -1.7 | -4.6 | -7.3 |
Other European countries | -0.4 | -0.9 | -1.2 | -0.2 | -0.8 | -1.4 | -0.1 | -0.3 | -0.7 | -1.1 | -2.8 | -4.2 |
Other developed economies | -0.1 | -0.2 | -0.3 | -0.6 | -1.3 | -1.7 | -0.1 | -0.3 | -0.7 | -0.8 | -2.0 | -3.0 |
Economies in transition | -0.3 | -0.5 | -0.6 | -0.2 | -0.5 | -0.7 | -0.1 | -0.3 | -0.6 | -0.9 | -1.8 | -2.4 |
South-Eastern Europe | -0.5 | -0.8 | -0.9 | -0.1 | -0.4 | -0.7 | 0.0 | -0.2 | -0.3 | -1.1 | -1.9 | -2.4 |
Commonwealth of Independent States and Georgia | -0.3 | -0.5 | -0.6 | -0.2 | -0.5 | -0.8 | -0.1 | -0.4 | -0.7 | -0.9 | -1.8 | -2.4 |
Russian Federation | -0.3 | -0.5 | -0.6 | -0.2 | -0.5 | -0.8 | -0.1 | -0.4 | -0.7 | -0.8 | -1.8 | -2.4 |
Developing economies | -0.2 | -0.3 | -0.5 | -0.3 | -0.9 | -1.3 | -1.1 | -2.3 | -3.0 | -1.7 | -3.7 | -5.1 |
Africa | -0.5 | -0.5 | -0.6 | -0.6 | -1.0 | -1.0 | -0.4 | -0.8 | -1.1 | -1.8 | -2.5 | -2.9 |
North Africa | -0.9 | -0.8 | -0.9 | -0.9 | -1.2 | -1.1 | -0.2 | -0.4 | -0.7 | -2.7 | -2.9 | -3.1 |
Sub-Saharan Africa | -0.3 | -0.3 | -0.4 | -0.5 | -0.9 | -0.9 | -0.5 | -0.9 | -1.3 | -1.5 | -2.3 | -2.8 |
Nigeria | -0.4 | -0.5 | -0.7 | -1.1 | -1.8 | -1.7 | -0.1 | -0.4 | -0.7 | -1.8 | -3.0 | -3.5 |
South Africa | -0.3 | -0.2 | -0.3 | -0.3 | -0.5 | -0.5 | -1.1 | -1.8 | -2.3 | -1.9 | -2.6 | -3.2 |
Others | -0.3 | -0.3 | -0.4 | -0.4 | -0.7 | -0.8 | -0.2 | -0.6 | -0.9 | -1.1 | -1.8 | -2.3 |
East and South Asia | -0.1 | -0.3 | -0.5 | -0.3 | -0.9 | -1.4 | -1.6 | -3.3 | -4.2 | -2.2 | -4.8 | -6.4 |
East Asia | -0.2 | -0.4 | -0.6 | -0.3 | -1.0 | -1.6 | -2.0 | -3.9 | -4.9 | -2.6 | -5.6 | -7.4 |
China | -0.2 | -0.4 | -0.7 | -0.4 | -1.1 | -1.8 | -3.0 | -5.7 | -6.8 | -3.7 | -7.6 | -9.6 |
South Asia | -0.1 | -0.2 | -0.3 | -0.1 | -0.4 | -0.5 | -0.3 | -0.8 | -1.5 | -0.6 | -1.5 | -2.5 |
India | -0.1 | -0.2 | -0.2 | -0.1 | -0.4 | -0.5 | -0.1 | -0.3 | -0.5 | -0.4 | -0.9 | -1.4 |
Western Asia | -0.1 | -0.2 | -0.3 | -0.2 | -0.5 | -0.7 | -0.1 | -0.3 | -0.6 | -0.6 | -1.2 | -1.9 |
Latin America and the Caribbean | -0.2 | -0.3 | -0.4 | -0.5 | -1.2 | -1.7 | -0.4 | -0.9 | -1.5 | -1.0 | -2.5 | -3.7 |
South America | -0.1 | -0.2 | -0.3 | -0.2 | -0.6 | -0.9 | -0.4 | -1.0 | -1.6 | -0.8 | -2.0 | -3.1 |
Brazil | -0.1 | -0.2 | -0.3 | -0.1 | -0.4 | -0.7 | -0.4 | -1.1 | -1.7 | -0.8 | -1.9 | -2.9 |
Mexico and Central America | -0.3 | -0.4 | -0.6 | -1.0 | -2.6 | -3.2 | -0.5 | -0.9 | -1.4 | -1.4 | -3.7 | -5.2 |
Mexico | -0.3 | -0.4 | -0.6 | -1.0 | -2.7 | -3.4 | -0.5 | -1.0 | -1.5 | -1.4 | -3.9 | -5.5 |
Caribbean | -0.1 | -0.2 | -0.4 | -0.5 | -1.2 | -1.6 | 0.0 | -0.1 | -0.3 | -0.7 | -1.7 | -2.5 |
Least developed countries | -0.2 | -0.3 | -0.4 | -0.3 | -0.6 | -0.8 | -0.2 | -0.5 | -0.7 | -0.8 | -1.6 | -2.1 |
a | See section on "Uncertainties and risks" for assumptions for these scenarios. | |||||||||||
Source: | UN/DESA. World Economic Situation and Prospects 2013 |
Developing Asia would also feel the consequences through trade channels, especially as it experiences decreased demand for intermediate products in the context of global value chains (see chapter II for further discussion). Economies in Latin America, Africa and Western Asia would be most impacted by lower demand for primary commodities, losing about 1 percent of their aggregate income.
It is difficult to ascertain the probability of these three risks materializing simultaneously.
However, considering the magnitude of the global consequences of each of these events separately, if these events were to occur at the same time, thereby reinforcing each other, the global economy would fall into another Great Recession.
Policy challenges
Current macroeconomic policy stances
Most developed countries have adopted a combination of fiscal austerity and expansionary monetary policies
Weakening economic growth and policy uncertainties cast a shadow over the global economic outlook. As indicated, most developed countries have adopted a combination of fiscal austerity and expansionary monetary policies, aiming to reduce public debt and lower debt refinancing costs in order to break away from the vicious dynamics between sovereign debt and banking sector fragility. These policy measures were expected to calm financial markets and restore consumer and investor confidence. Supported by structural reforms of entitlement programmes, labour markets and business regulation, the improved environment is expected to help restore economic growth and reduce unemployment. However, reducing debt stocks is proving to be much more challenging than policymakers expected.Public
debt rollover requirements remain very high and continue to
expose fiscal balances to the whims of financial markets. Helped
by the
QE policies of central banks, borrowing costs have been contained and
are elevated only for a subset of debt-distressed euro area countries.
While the QE programmes have helped lower long-term interest rates,
their impact on economic growth will be rather limited at this stage of
the recovery.
An additional
problem is that fiscal
consolidation efforts of most
developed countries rely
more on spending retrenchment than improving
revenue collection. The former tends
to be more detrimental to economic
growth in the short run, particularly
when the economy
is in a downward
cycle.[14] In many
developed countries, public
investment is being cut
more severely than any other item, which may
also prove costly to
medium-term growth. In most cases,
spending
cuts also involve
entitlement reforms, which
immediately weaken
automatic stabilizers in
the short run by curtailing
pension benefits, shortening
the length of
unemployment benefit schemes and/or shifting
more of the burden of
healthcare costs to households. Moreover,
the fiscal
austerity measures
have
been found to induce greater inequality in the short run.[15] The
impact tends to be stronger when
unemployment effects are higher, when
there is no compensation for the cost of entitlement reform to lower-
and middle-income groups, and when
revenue increases are pursued
through increases in sales or value-added tax rates. Rising
inequality
by itself tends to weaken
the recovery, as lower-income groups tend to
have higher spending pro-pensities. thus The
distributional impact of
spending and revenue measuresshould be a concern to macroeconomic
policymakers. In short, downside risks
for developed countries remain
extremely high, because the present policy stances are, on
balance, not
supportive of growth and job creation, and thus fail
to definitively
break out of the vicious circle.
[14] See World Economic Situation and Prospects 2012 (United Nations
publication, Sales No. E.12. II.C.2), box I.3.[15] International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Monitor: Taking stock—A progress report on fiscal adjustment (Washington, D.C., October 2012).
-------
Most developing countries and
economies in transition have relatively
stronger fiscal positions. Some have opted to put fiscal consolidation
on hold in the face of global economic weakening. Fiscal
deficits may
rise in most low-income countries that have slowing government
revenue
from commodity exports and the growing weight of food and energy
subsidies. Concerns
are also mounting in developing countries about the
possible
adverse effects of QE on the financial and macroeconomic
stability of their economies through increased
volatility in
international prices of commodities, capital fl ows and exchange
rates.
Such concerns underlie the further accumulation of reserves and justify
maintaining capital controls. Facing a
slowdown in growth and
Inflation, central banks in many developing countries and
economies in
transition have eased monetary policy during 2012. In the outlook,
further monetary easing will be likely in many of these countries,
except for those with persistently high Inflation, such as South Asia
and Africa.
The need for more forceful and concerted actions
Given the
looming uncertainties and downside risks discussed in the
previous section, current
policy stances seem to fall well short of
what is needed to prevent the global economy from slipping into another
recession. More forceful and concerted actions should be
considered.
Policy uncertainties should be addressed immediately and a different approach must be taken
First,
the policy uncertainties associated with the three key risks
discussed in the downward scenario need to be addressed immediately
through shifts in approach and greater consideration of international
spillover effects of national policies. In the euro area,
the piecemeal
approach to dealing with the debt crises of individual countries of the
past two years should be replaced by a more comprehensive and
integrated approach, so as to address the systemic crisis of the
monetary union and mitigate the key risks for the stability of the
global economy. While individual countries may still need to confront
issues in their domestic economic structures and institutions, crucial
collective efforts are needed to close the institutional gaps and mend
the pervasive deficiencies of the EMU, including through laying solid
foundations for fiscal and banking unions. Although important steps in
this direction are being taken or considered, the present state of
affairs requires much swifter and more forceful action. Only when
concrete
actions are taken that will restore confidence in the union can other
more technical policy measures be put in place to deal with such issues
as how to resolve debt overhang and how to break the linkage between
sovereign risk and bank fragility. Policymakers in the United States
should prevent a sudden and severe contraction in fiscal
policy—the so-called fiscal cliff —and overcome the
political gridlock that was still present at the end of 2012. As holds
for the EU, the global ramifications of failing to do so should be
considered. It is only
feasible to work out the current debt problems
over the long run, and a fiscal
consolidation plan will be credible
only when rooted in an explicit strategy of economic growth and jobs
creation. The major
developing countries facing the risk of hard
landings of their economies should engage
in stronger countercyclical
policy stances aligned with measures to address structural
problems
over the medium term. China,
for instance, possesses ample
policy space
for a much stronger push to rebalance its economy towards domestic
demand, including
through increased
government spending on public
services such as health care,
education
and social
security—all
of which will help lower precautionary household savings and increase
consumption, thus reducing dependence on external demand.
Fiscal policy should become more countercyclical, more supportive of jobs creation and more equitable
Second,
more specifically, fiscal
policy should become more
countercyclical, more supportive
of jobs creation and more
equitable.
The
present focus on fiscal consolidation in the short run,
especially
among developed countries, has
proven to be counterproductive and to
cause more
protracted debt adjustment. The focus needs
to shift in a
number of different directions:
- As a starting point, a first priority of fiscal adjustment should be to provide more direct support to output and employment growth by boosting aggregate demand and, at the same time, spread out plans for achieving fiscal sustainability over the medium-to-long term. Introducing cyclically adjusted or structural budget targets will allow for keeping a countercyclical stance while aiming for fiscal sustainability over the medium term.
- Fiscal multipliers tend to be more forceful during a downturn, but can be strengthened further by shifting budget priorities to growth-enhancing spending, undoing cuts in public investment and expanding subsidies on hiring (which may be targeted towards new labour entrants and the long unemployed) as well as enhancing public work programmes and employment schemes. On the tax side, reducing taxes on labour and changing tax codes to reduce labour income tax wedges for youth, women, and older workers are options that provide short-term boosts to employment as well as labour supply.
- The distributional consequences of fiscal policies should be duly considered, not only for equity reasons, but also because of their implications for growth and employment generation. As indicated, rising inequality tends to have a dampening effect on aggregate demand and hence on economic growth. Shifting spending priorities to enhance employment effects will help avoid such an outcome, as much as would maintaining an adequate degree of progressivity in taxation and access to social benefits. Many middle- and lowincome countries may wish to reconsider across-the-board subsidies on food and fuel; these tend to come with a heavy fiscal cost, while the benefits may accrue most to higher-income groups. Better targeting would provide more effective income protection to the poor at potentially much lower fiscal cost.
- Economic recovery can be strengthened in the short and longer run by promoting green growth through fiscal incentives and investments in infrastructure and new technologies. Lessons can be learned from several developing countries, such as the Republic of Korea, which have successfully provided economic stimulus through green infrastructure investment and energy-saving incentives. This has been found to generate strong employment effects, suggesting that investing in green growth can be a win-win solution. Moreover, these measures are imperative to substantially accelerating reductions in greenhouse gas emissions—an essential step in combating climate change. Developing countries also stand to gain, provided they obtain technological and financial support to adopt the still higher-cost clean energy technologies without jeopardizing economic development prospects.
Global financial market instability needs to be attacked at its root causes
Third, global
financial market instability needs to be attacked at its
roots. This challenge
is twofold. First, greater synergy
must be found
between monetary and fiscal stimulus. Continuation of
expansionary
monetary policies among developed countries will be needed, but
negative
spillover effects into capital-flow and exchange-rate
volatility must be contained. This will
require reaching agreement at
the international level on the magnitude, speed and timing
of QE
policies within a broader framework of targets to redress the global
imbalances. The second part
of the challenge is to accelerate
regulatory reforms of the financial sector. This will be
essential in
order to avoid
the systemic risks and excessive
risk-taking that
have
led to the low-growth
trap and financial
fragility in developed
countries and high capital
flow volatility for developing countries.
Steps have
been proposed in some national jurisdictions, but
implementation
is lagging behind.
Moreover, insufficient
coordination between national bodies appears to
result in a regulatory patchwork. Global financial stability is
unlikely to be achieved in the absence of a comprehensive, binding and
internationally coordinated framework. This is needed
to limit
regulatory arbitrage, which includes shifting high-risk
activities from
more to less strictly regulated environments. Among other
measures,
such a
framework should include strict
limits on positions that
financial investors can take in commodity
futures and derivatives
markets — measures that
may also help stem volatility in capital
flows and commodity prices.
Sufficient resources need to be made available to developing countries
Fourth, sufficient resources must be available to developing countries, especially and those possessing limited fiscal spacefacing large development needs. These resources will be needed to accelerate progress towards the achievement of the MDGs and for investments in sustainable and resilient growth, especially for the LDCs. has Fiscal austerity among donor countriesalso affected aid budgets, as seen in the decline of ODA in real terms in 2011. Further declines may be expected in the outlook. Apart from delivering on existing aid commitments, donor countries should consider mechanisms to delink aid flows from their business cycles so as to prevent delivery shortfalls in times of crisis when the need for development aid is most urgent. In this regard, internationally agreed taxes (such as airline levies, currency transaction taxes or carbon taxes), along with the possibility of leveraging idle special drawing rights (SDRs) for development finance could be considered, as suggested in a recent United Nations report.[16]
[16] World Economic and Social Survey 2012: In Search of New Development Finance (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.12.II.C.1).
--------------
A jobs creation and green growth-oriented agenda as outlined above is compatible with medium-term reduction of public debt ratios and benign global rebalancing, as shown in a scenario of internationally concerted policies simulated using the United Nations Global Policy Model (GPM).[17] With continued existing policies, but assuming no major deepening of the euro crisis, growth of WGP would average, at best, about 3 percent per year on average, far from sufficient to deal with the jobs crisis or bring down public debt ratios. The alternative scenario, based on the agenda outlined above, includes a shift in fiscal policies away from austerity and towards more job creation through, inter alia, more spending on infrastructure; energy efficiency, social programmes and tax and subsidy measures to stimulate private investment projects in these areas; continued expansionary monetary policies aligned with stronger capital account regulation to stem capital flow volatility; and enhanced development assistance to the poorest nations. The GPM simulations show that under such a policy scenario, WGP would grow at an average rate of 4.5 percent between 2013 and 2017, public debt-to-GDP ratios would stabilize and start falling from 2016 or earlier. Employment levels in major developed countries would gradually increase and return to pre-crises levels in absolute terms by 2014 and by 2017 after accounting for labour force growth. The employment recovery thus would come much sooner than in the baseline, although remaining protracted even with the suggested internationally concerted strategy for growth and jobs. An additional 33 million jobs per year on average would be created in developing and transition economies between 2013 and 2017 (see box I.3).
[17] The scenario is an update of the ones presented in World Economic Situation and Prospects 2012, op. cit., pp. 33-36; and United Nations Economic and Social Council, “World economic situation and prospects as of mid-2012 (E/2012/72).
Box I.3 |
An internationally coordinated strategy for jobs and growth |
---|---|
An alternative policy scenario
based on the recommendations in this chapter has been created using the
United Nations Global Policy Model (GPM). The key finding is that such
a scenario would avoid a widespread double-dip recession; instead, it
would allow for a benign rebalancing of the global economy. Job losses
caused by the global financial crisis would see recovery and a shift
towards more sustainable fiscal balances and debt levels would begin,
setting the global economy on a more sustained (and sustainable) path
to growth.
The key differences with the baseline policy assumptions are that:
Furthermore, it is assumed that
monetary policy action is better coordinated internationally to prevent
the strategy underlying the alternative scenario from being disrupted
by excessive exchange-rate and capital fl ow volatility. Through
concerted efforts, developing countries (low-income countries, in
particular), are provided with adequate access to offi cial development
assistance and other external fi nancing to complement domestic
resources for fi nancing new investments in infrastructure and
sustainable energy and agriculture.
Figure A: Employment levels of selected countries or country groups(a) Europe, Japan and other developed economies (b) United States (c) Transition and developing economies Baseline Coordinated strategy for jobs and growth Figure B: GDP growth rates of selected countries or country groups Percentage (a) Europe, Japan and other developed economies (b) United States (c) Transition and developing economies Baseline Coordinated strategy for jobs and growth |
|
Source: UN/DESA Global Policy Model ( http://www.un.org/esa/policy/publications/ungpm.html). |
Under these assumptions, growth of world gross product would accelerate to about 4.5 percent per year, with both developed and developing economies accelerating output growth by between 1 and 2 percentage points compared with the baseline (see figures A and B). Shortly after the new policies are in place, the jobs defi cit caused by the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 would start to close, especially in the developed countries. Employment levels in major developed countries would gradually increase and return to pre-crisis levels in absolute terms by 2014, and by 2017 after accounting for labour force growth. The employment recovery would thus come much sooner than in the baseline, although it would remain protracted, even with the suggested internationally concerted strategy for growth and jobs. An additional 33 million jobs per year on average would be created in developing and transition economies between 2013 and 2017.
The simulation also shows that more rapid recovery of growth and employment helps to stabilize public debts. After an initial increase, government defi cits would quickly decrease, stabilizing public debt ratios in the medium term and reducing them thereafter (see Appendix table). As countries with an external surplus apply more fiscal stimulus, private investment and consumption would increase, leading to higher imports and a reduction of global current account imbalances.
With investments targeting higher energy efficiency and production of renewable energy, world energy prices would stabilize on lower levels over the medium run. Meanwhile, investment in sustainable agricultural production would allow meeting a growing demand for food and stabilize world food prices.
Source: UN/DESA Global Policy Model ( http://www.un.org/esa/policy/publications/ungpm.html).
Figure A: Employment levels of selected countries or country groups
Index: 2008=100
(a) Europe, Japan and other developed economies
(b) United States
(c) Transition and developing economies
China and India
CIS, and other developing
Baseline
Coordinated strategy for jobs and growth
Global economic outlook
Figure B: GDP growth rates of selected countries or country groups
Percentage
(a) Europe, Japan and other developed economies
(b) United States
(c) Transition and developing economies
Baseline
Coordinated strategy for jobs and growth
Global economic outlook
Appendix
An internationally coordinated strategy for jobs and growth, 2012-2017
2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
GDP Growth (percentage) | ||||||
United States | 2.1 | 3.1 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 3.9 |
Europe | -0.2 | 2.9 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.7 |
Japan and other developed countries | 2.0 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.7 |
China and India | 7.3 | 9.0 | 9.3 | 9.0 | 8.3 | 8.5 |
CIS and Western Asia (major oil exporters) | 3.7 | 3.3 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 3.8 |
Other developing countries | 3.3 | 4.7 | 5.6 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.6 |
Employment created above the baseline (millions) | ||||||
United States | 0.0 | 2.1 | 3.8 | 5.0 | 6.3 | 5.7 |
Europe | 0.0 | 3.0 | 4.9 | 5.1 | 5.2 | 4.8 |
Japan and other developed countries | 0.0 | 1.1 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 2.4 | 2.6 |
China and India | 0.0 | 11.3 | 15.0 | 18.3 | 21.7 | 10.8 |
CIS and Western Asia (major oil exporters) | 0.0 | 2.3 | 3.9 | 5.4 | 6.8 | 6.5 |
Other developing countries | 0.0 | 7.9 | 13.2 | 17.7 | 21.7 | 2.5 |
Growth of government spending (constant prices, percentage per annum) | ||||||
United States | -2.4 | -0.7 | 2.1 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 3.5 |
Europe | -1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.6 |
Japan and other developed countries | 0.9 | 1.7 | 2.2 | -0.6 | 2.6 | 2.9 |
China and India | 8.5 | 9.0 | 8.9 | 8.9 | 8.9 | 8.9 |
CIS and Western Asia (major oil exporters) | 4.0 | 4.9 | 4.8 | 4.7 | 4.7 | 4.6 |
Other developing countries | 4.8 | 6.8 | 6.8 | 6.8 | 6.7 | 6.7 |
Growth of private investment (constant prices, percentage per annum) | ||||||
United States | 5.2 | 11.2 | 11.6 | 10.5 | 10.0 | 6.3 |
Europe | -0.7 | 4.0 | 7.2 | 6.4 | 5.8 | 6.8 |
Japan and other developed countries | 2.6 | 4.6 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 3.4 | 2.8 |
China and India | 5.3 | 8.6 | 8.1 | 7.6 | 5.6 | 5.4 |
CIS and Western Asia (major oil exporters) | 8.5 | 3.5 | 3.2 | 1.8 | 3.9 | 3.8 |
Other developing countries | 4.7 | 5.0 | 6.4 | 6.9 | 7.6 | 7.8 |
Net government financial surplus (percentage of GDP) | ||||||
United States | -11.0 | -8.5 | -6.9 | -6.0 | -5.4 | -4.9 |
Europe | -7.2 | -6.0 | -4.9 | -3.8 | -2.9 | -2.3 |
Japan and other developed countries | -7.9 | -7.1 | -6.6 | -5.5 | -5.3 | -5.1 |
China and India | -3.3 | -2.5 | -1.8 | -1.3 | -1.2 | -1.2 |
CIS and Western Asia (major oil exporters) | 0.1 | -0.1 | -0.2 | -0.1 | -0.1 | -0.1 |
Other developing countries | -3.1 | -2.4 | -1.7 | -1.3 | -1.0 | -0.8 |
Net private sector financial surplus (percentage of GDP) | ||||||
United States | 8.5 | 5.7 | 3.8 | 2.5 | 1.6 | 0.8 |
Europe | 8.3 | 7.5 | 6.6 | 5.5 | 4.6 | 3.9 |
Japan and other developed countries | 7.1 | 6.5 | 6.3 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 6.0 |
China and India | 4.0 | 2.8 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 2.5 |
CIS and Western Asia (major oil exporters) | 5.4 | 4.8 | 3.9 | 3.5 | 2.9 | 2.6 |
Other developing countries | 2.4 | 2.0 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 1.0 |
Current account deficit (percentage of GDP) | ||||||
United States | -2.6 | -2.9 | -3.1 | -3.5 | -3.9 | -4.1 |
Europe | 1.1 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 |
Japan and other developed countries | -0.8 | -0.6 | -0.2 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.8 |
China and India | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 1.1 | 1.4 |
CIS and Western Asia (major oil exporters) | 5.4 | 4.8 | 3.7 | 3.4 | 2.8 | 2.4 |
Other developing countries | -0.7 | -0.4 | -0.2 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.2 |
Government debt (percentage of GDP) | ||||||
United States | 76.4 | 75.9 | 73.6 | 70.6 | 67.0 | 63.1 |
Europe | 74.5 | 73.6 | 72.1 | 70.5 | 67.4 | 64.9 |
Japan and other developed countries | 138.3 | 136.0 | 133.0 | 129.7 | 127.0 | 125.1 |
China and India | 23.8 | 22.5 | 20.1 | 18.0 | 17.3 | 16.9 |
CIS and Western Asia (major oil exporters) | 40.5 | 42.8 | 45.5 | 47.4 | 49.1 | 50.2 |
Other developing countries | 36.6 | 36.6 | 36.3 | 36.0 | 35.9 | 35.9 |
Memo: | ||||||
Growth of Gross World Product at market rate (percentage) | 2.3 | 3.8 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.6 |
Growth of Gross World Product at ppp rate (percentage) | 3.1 | 4.6 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.1 | 5.2 |
Global creation of employment above baseline (millions) | 0.0 | 27.8 | 42.6 | 53.6 | 64.1 | 32.9 |
Average employment creation in developing countries above baseline (millions) | 0.0 | 21.5 | 32.2 | 41.4 | 50.3 | 19.8 |
Growth of exports of good and services (percentage) | 3.2 | 5.9 | 5.6 | 6.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 |
Real world price of energy (index) | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
Real world price of food & primary commodities (index) | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.4 |
Real world price of manufactures (index) | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
Source |
Source: UN/DESA Global Policy Model, available from http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/publications/un_gpm.shtml.
World Economic Situation and Prospects 2013
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2013Chap1_embargo.pdf
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Extra Report:
Definition of 'Bush Tax Cuts'
A series of temporary income tax relief measures enacted by President George W. Bush in 2001 and 2003. The tax cuts lowered federal income tax rates for everyone, decreased the marriage penalty, lowered capital gains taxes, lowered the tax rate on dividend income, increased the child tax credit from $500 to $1,000 per child, eliminated the phaseout on personal exemptions for higher-income taxpayers and eliminated the phaseout on itemized deductions and eliminated the estate tax.
Investopedia explanation for 'Bush Tax Cuts'
Because the tax cuts were in place for so many years, they began to feel permanent rather than temporary, and taxpayers and politicians raised a major outcry as their expiration date approached. Those who wanted to let the tax cuts expire as scheduled argued that the government needed the extra tax revenue in the face of massive its budget deficits. Those who wanted to extend the tax cuts or make them permanent argued that because taxes reduce economic growth and stifle entrepreneurship and incentives to work, effectively increasing taxes during a recession was a bad idea
Real world price of food & primary
commodities (index)X 1.2X 1.2X1.3 X1.3X 1.4 X1.4
Real world price of manufactures (index) X1.0 X1.0X 1.0X 1.0 X1.0X 1.0